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Abstract
This paper formulates a model of utility for a continuous time frame-
work that captures the decision-maker’s concern with ambiguity about both
volatility and drift. Corresponding extensions of some basic results in asset
pricing theory are presented. First, we derive arbitrage-free pricing rules
based on hedging arguments. Ambiguous volatility implies market incom-
pleteness that rules out perfect hedging. Consequently, hedging arguments
determine prices only up to intervals. However, sharper predictions can be
obtained by assuming preference maximization and equilibrium. Thus we
apply the model of utility to a representative agent endowment economy to
study equilibrium asset returns. A version of the C-CAPM is derived and
the effects of ambiguous volatility are described.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Objectives
This paper formulates a model of utility for a continuous time framework that
captures the decision-maker’s concern with ambiguity or model uncertainty. Its
novelty lies in the range of model uncertainty that is accommodated, specifically
in the modeling of ambiguity about both drift and volatility, and in corresponding
extensions of some basic results in asset pricing theory. First, we derive arbitrage-
free pricing rules based on hedging arguments. Ambiguous volatility implies mar-
ket incompleteness and thus, in general, rules out perfect hedging. Consequently,
hedging arguments determine prices only up to intervals. However, sharper pre-
dictions can be obtained by assuming preference maximization and equilibrium.
Thus we apply the model of utility to a representative agent endowment economy
to study equilibrium asset returns in a sequential Radner style market setup. A
version of the C-CAPM is derived and the effects of ambiguous volatility are de-
scribed. A pivotal role for ‘state prices’ is demonstrated in both the hedging and
equilibrium analyses thus extending to the case of comprehensive ambiguity this
cornerstone element of asset pricing theory.
The model of utility is a continuous time version of multiple priors (or maxmin)
utility formulated by Gilboa and Schmeidler [30] for a static setting. Related
continuous time models are provided by Chen and Epstein [12] and also Hansen,
Sargent and coauthors (see Anderson et al. [1], for example).1 In all existing
literature on continuous time utility, ambiguity is modeled so as to retain the
property that all priors are equivalent, that is, they agree which events are null.
This universal restriction is driven not by an economic rationale but rather by the
technical demands of continuous time modeling, specifically by the need to work
within a probability space framework. Notably, in order to describe ambiguity
authors invariably rely on Girsanov’s theorem for changing measures. It provides
a tractable characterization of alternative hypotheses about the true probability
law, but it also limits alternative hypotheses to correspond to measures that are
both mutually equivalent and that differ from one another only in what they imply
about drift. This paper defines a more general framework within which one can
model the utility of an individual who is not completely confident in any single
probability law for either drift or volatility. This is done while maintaining a
separation between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution as in Duffie and
1The discrete time counterpart of the former is axiomatized in Epstein and Schneider [24].
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Epstein [20].
At a technical level, the analysis requires a significant departure from existing
continuous time modeling because ambiguous volatility cannot be modeled within
a probability space framework, where there exists a probability measure that de-
fines the set of null (or impossible) events. In our companion paper Epstein and
Ji [23], we exploit and extend recent advances in stochastic calculus that do not
require a probability space framework. The reader is referred to that paper for a
rigorous treatment of the technical details involved in defining a utility function
that accommodates aversion to ambiguity about volatility, including for proofs
regarding utility, and also for extensive references to the noted mathematics liter-
ature. Our treatment below is less formal but is otherwise largely self-contained.
Proofs are provided here for all the asset pricing results.
1.2. Why ambiguous volatility?
A large literature has argued that stochastic time varying volatility is important
for understanding empirical features of asset markets; for recent examples, see
Eraker and Shaliastovich [27], Drechsler [18], Bollerslev et al. [9], Bansal et al.
[3], Beeler and Campbell [6], Bansal et al. [4], and Campbell et al. [10], where the
first three employ continuous time models.2 In macroeconomic contexts, Bloom
[8] and Fernandez-Villaverde and Guerron-Quintana [28] are recent studies that
find evidence of stochastic time varying volatility and its effects on real variables.
In all of these papers, evidence suggests that relevant volatilities follow compli-
cated dynamics. The common modeling response is to postulate correspondingly
complicated parametric laws of motion, including specification of the dynamics of
the volatility of volatility. However, one might question whether agents in these
models can learn these laws of motion precisely, and more generally, whether it
is plausible to assume that agents become completely confident in any particular
law of motion. In their review of the literature on volatility derivatives, Carr
and Lee [11, pp. 324-5] raise this criticism of assuming a particular parametric
process for the volatility of the underlying asset. The drawback they note is “the
dependence of model value on the particular process used to model the short-term
volatility.” They write that “the problem is particularly acute for volatility mod-
els because the quantity being modeled is not directly observable. Although an
2Bollerslev et al. argue extensively for the modeling advantages of the continuous time frame-
work. For example, they write that a continuous time formulation “has the distinct advantage
of allowing for the calculation of internally consistent model implications across all sampling
frequencies and return horizons.”
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estimate for the initially unobserved state variable can be inferred from market
prices of derivative securities, noise in the data generates noise in the estimate,
raising doubts that a modeler can correctly select any parametric stochastic process
from the menu of consistent alternatives.”
Thus we are led to develop a model of preference that accommodates ambi-
guity about volatility. In the model the individual takes a stand only on bounds
rather than on any particular parametric model of volatility dynamics. Thus max-
imization of preference leads to decisions that are robust to misspecifications of
the dynamics of volatility (as well as drift). Accordingly, we think of this aspect
of our model as providing a way to robustify stochastic volatility modeling.
To illustrate the latter perspective, consider a stochastic environment with a
one-dimensional driving process. By a stochastic volatility model we mean the
hypothesis that the driving process has zero drift and that its volatility is stochas-
tic and is described by a single process (σt). The specification of a single process
for volatility indicates the investor’s complete confidence in the implied dynamics.
Suppose, however, that (σ1t ) and (σ
2
t ) describe two alternative stochastic volatil-
ity models that are put forth by expert econometricians; for instance, they might
conform to the Hull and White [33] and Heston [31] parametric forms respectively.
The models have comparable empirical credentials and are not easily distinguished
empirically, but their implications for optimal choice (or for the pricing of deriva-
tive securities, which is the context for the earlier quote from Carr and Lee) differ
significantly. Faced with these two models, the investor might place probability 1
2
on each being the true model. But why should she be certain that either one is
true? Both (σ1t ) and (σ
2
t ) may fit data well to some approximation, but other ap-
proximating models may do as well. An intermediate model such as
(
1
2
σ1t +
1
2
σ2t
)
is one alternative, but there are many others that “lie between” (σ1t ) and (σ
2
t ) and
that plausibly should be taken into account. Accordingly, we are led to hypothe-
size that the investor views as possible all volatility processes with values lying in
the interval [σt (ω) , σt (ω)] for every t and ω, where
σt (ω) = min{σ1t (ω) , σ2t (ω)} and σt (ω) = max{σ1t (ω) , σ2t (ω)}. (1.1)
Given also the conservative nature of multiple priors utility, the individual will
be led thereby to take decisions that are robust to (many) misspecifications of
the dynamics of volatility. This special case of our model is described further in
Section 2.2.
A possible objection to modeling ambiguity about volatility might take the
form: “One can approximate the realized quadratic variation of a stock price (for
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example) arbitrarily well from frequent observations over any short time interval,
and thus estimate the law of motion for its volatility extremely well. Consequently,
ambiguity about volatility is implausible for a sophisticated agent.” However,
even if one accepts the hypothesis that, contrary to the view of Carr and Lee,
accurate estimation is possible, such an objection relies also on the assumption of
a tight connection between the past and future that we relax. We are interested in
situations where realized past volatility may not be a reliable predictor of volatility
in the future. The rationale is that the stochastic environment is often too complex
for a sophisticated individual to believe that her theory, whether of volatility or
of other variables, captures all aspects. Being sophisticated, she is aware of the
incompleteness of her theory. Accordingly, when planning ahead she believes
there may be time-varying factors excluded by her theory that she understands
poorly and that are difficult to identify statistically. Thus she perceives ambiguity
when looking into the future. The amount of ambiguity may depend on past
observations, and may be small for some histories, but it cannot be excluded a
priori.
A similar rationale for ambiguity is emphasized by Epstein and Schneider
[25, 26]. Nonstationarity is emphasized by Ilut and Schneider [35] in their model
of business cycles driven by ambiguity. In finance, Lo and Mueller [40] argue that
the (perceived) failures of the dominant paradigm, for example, in the context of
the recent crisis, are due to inadequate attention paid to the kind of uncertainty
faced by agents and modelers. Accordingly, they suggest a new taxonomy of uncer-
tainty that extends the dichotomy between risk and ambiguity (or ‘Knightian un-
certainty’). In particular, they refer to partially reducible uncertainty to describe
“situations in which there is a limit to what we can deduce about the underly-
ing phenomena generating the data. Examples include data-generating processes
that exhibit: (1) stochastic or time-varying parameters that vary too frequently
to be estimated accurately; (2) nonlinearities too complex to be captured by ex-
isting models, techniques and datasets; (3) nonstationarities and non-ergodicities
that render useless the Law of Large Numbers, Central Limit Theorem, and other
methods of statistical inference and approximation; and (4) the dependence on
relevant but unknown and unknowable conditioning information.” Lo and Mueller
do not offer a model. One can view this paper as an attempt to introduce some
of their concerns into continuous time modeling and particularly into formal asset
pricing theory.
The natural question is whether and in what form the cornerstones of received
asset pricing theory extend to a framework with ambiguous volatility. Some ini-
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tial steps in answering this question are provided in Section 3.3 A notable find-
ing is that both equilibrium and “no-arbitrage’ asset prices can be characterized
by means of ‘state prices’ even though the analysis cannot be undertaken in a
probability space framework (which precludes talking about state price densities
or about equivalent martingale, or risk neutral, measures). First, however, the
remainder of the introduction provides an informal outline of our approach to
modeling ambiguous volatility. Then Section 2 describes the new model of utility.
Following the asset pricing results, concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.
Proofs are collected in appendices.
1.3. An informal outline
Time varies over {0, h, 2h, ..., (n− 1) h, nh}, where 0 < h < 1 scales the period
length and n is a positive integer with nh = T . Uncertainty is driven by the
colors of balls drawn from a sequence of urns. It is known that each urn contains
100 balls that are either red (R), green (G), or yellow (Y ), and that the urns
are constructed independently (informally speaking). A ball is drawn from each
urn and the colors drawn determine the evolution of the state variable B = (Bt)
according to: B0 = 0 and, for t = h, ..., nh,
dBt ≡ Bt − Bt−h =


h1/2 if Rt
−h1/2 if Gt
0 if Yt
We describe three alternative assumptions regarding the additional information
available about the urns. They provide intuition for continuous time models
where (respectively) the driving process is (i) a standard Brownian motion, (ii)
a Brownian motion modified by ambiguous drift, and (iii) a Brownian motion
modified by ambiguous volatility. The first two are included in order to provide
perspective on the third.
Scenario 1: You are told further that Y = 0 and that R = G for each urn (thus all
urns are known to have the identical composition). The state process (Bt) can be
described equivalently in terms of the measure p0 =
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0
)
and its i.i.d. product
that induces a measure P0 on trajectories of B. Thus we have a random walk
that, by Donsker’s Theorem, converges weakly to a standard Brownian motion in
3Early work on the pricing of derivative securities when volatility is ambiguous includes Lyons
[41] and Avellaneda et al. [2]. See Section 3 for the relation to our analysis and for additional
references.
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the continuous time limit as h → 0 (see Billingsley [7, Thm. 14.1 and Example
12.3], for example).
Scenario 2: You are told again that Y = 0 for every urn. However, you are given
less information than previously about the other colors. Specifically, you are told
that for each urn the proportion of R lies in the interval
[
1
2
− 1
2
κh1/2, 1
2
+ 1
2
κh1/2
]
,
for some fixed κ > 0. Thus the composition of the urn at any time t could be
given by a measure of the form pµt =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
µth
1/2, 1
2
− 1
2
µth
1/2, 0
)
, for some µt
satisfying | µt |≤ κ. The increment dBt has mean and variance under pµt given
by4
E (dBt) = µth and var (dBt) = h− (µth)2 = h+ o (h) .
Accordingly, the weaker information about the composition of urns implies am-
biguity about drift per unit time, but up to the o (h) approximation, it does not
affect the corresponding one-step-ahead variance.
The preceding is the building block of the Chen and Epstein (2002) con-
tinuous time model of ambiguity about drift.5 The transition from discrete to
continuous time amounts to a minor variation of the convergence result noted
for Scenario 1 (see Skiadas [50] for some details). The sets {pµt :| µt |≤ κ},
t = 0, h, 2h, ..., (n− 1) h, nh, of one-step-ahead measures can be combined to con-
struct a set P of priors over the set Ω of possible trajectories for B. It is not
difficult to see that the priors are mutually equivalent, that is, they all agree on
which events are null (have zero probability). Further, as described in Section
2.1, equivalence holds in the continuous time limit. Consequently, the model with
ambiguous drift can be formulated within a probability space framework with
ambient probability measure P0 according to which B is a standard Brownian
motion. Alternative hypotheses about the true probability law can be expressed
via densities with respect to P0.
Scenario 3: Turn now to a model having ambiguity only about volatility. You are
told that R = G, thus eliminating uncertainty about the relative composition of
R versus G. However, the information about Y is weakened and you are told only
that Y ≤ 20.6
Any probability measure over trajectories consistent with these facts makes B
a martingale. In that sense, there is certainty that B is a martingale. However,
the one-step-ahead variance σ2t h depends on the number of yellow balls and thus
4o (h) represents a function such that o (h) /h→ 0 as h→ 0.
5It corresponds to the special case of their model called κ-ignorance.
6This scenario is adapted from Levy et al. [38].
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is ambiguous - it equals pth, where we know only that 0 ≤ 1− pt ≤ 0.2, or
.8 = σ2 ≤ σ2t ≤ σ2 = 1. (1.2)
Because urns are perceived to be independent, they may differ in actual compo-
sition. Therefore, any value for σt in the interval [σ, σ] could apply at any time.
Independence implies also that past draws do not reveal anything about the future
and ambiguity is left undiminished. This is an extreme case that is a feature of
this example and is a counterpart of the assumption of i.i.d. increments in the
binomial tree.
By a generalization of Donsker’s Theorem (Yuan [58]), the above trinomial
model converges weakly (or “in distribution”) to a continuous time model on the
interval [0, T ] as the time period length h goes to 0.7
The limiting continuous time model inherits from the discrete time trinomial
the interpretation that it models certainty that the driving process B = (Bt) is a
martingale, whereas volatility is known only up to the interval [σ, σ]. To be more
precise about the meaning of volatility, let the quadratic variation process of B
be defined by
〈B〉t(ω) = lim
△tk→0
Σ
tk≤t
| Btk+1(ω)− Btk(ω) |2 (1.3)
where 0 = t1 < . . . < tn = t and △tk = tk+1 − tk.8 Then the volatility (σt) of B
is defined by
d〈B〉t = σ2t dt.
Therefore, the interval constraint on volatility can be written also in the form
σ2t ≤ 〈B〉t ≤ σ2t. (1.4)
7To clarify the meaning of weak convergence, consider the set Ω of continuous trajectories on
[0, T ] that begin at the origin. For each period length h, identify any discrete time trajectory
with a continuous path on [0, T ] obtained by linear interpolation. Then each hypothesis about
the compositions of all urns implies a probability measure on Ω. By varying over all hypotheses
consistent with the above description of the urns, one obtains a set Ph of probability laws on
Ω. Suppose that P is a given set of measures on Ω. Then say that Ph converges weakly to P
if supP∈Ph E
P f converges to supP∈P E
P f for every function f : Ω → R that is bounded and
suitably continuous. The cited result by Yuan implies this convergence for the set P constructed
below corresponding to the special case of our model for which volatility is constrained by (1.2).
See also Dolinsky et al. [17] for a related result.
8By Follmer [29] and Karandikar [36], the above limit exists almost surely for every measure
that makes B a martingale. Because there is certainty that B is a martingale, this limited
universality is all we need.
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The preceding defines the stochastic environment. Consumption and other
processes are defined accordingly (for example, they are required to be adapted
to the natural filtration generated by B). We emphasize that our model is much
more general than suggested by this outline. Importantly, the interval [σ, σ] can be
time and state varying, and the dependence on history of the interval at time t is
unrestricted, thus permitting any model of how ambiguity varies with observation
(that is, learning) to be accommodated. In addition, we admit multidimensional
driving processes and also ambiguity about both drift and volatility.
As noted earlier, ambiguity about volatility leads to a set of nonequivalent
priors, that is, to disagreement between priors as to what events are possible (or to
ambiguity about what is possible). To see this, let B be a Brownian motion under
P0 and denote by P
σ and P σ the probability distributions over continuous paths
induced by the two processes (σBt) and (σBt). Given the ambiguity described
by (1.4), P σ and P σ are two alternative hypotheses about the probability law
driving uncertainty. It is apparent that they are mutually singular, and hence not
equivalent, because9
P σ({〈B〉T = σ2T}) = 1 = P σ({〈B〉T = σ2T}). (1.5)
We caution against a possible conceptual misinterpretation of (1.5). If P σ
and P σ were the only two hypotheses being considered, then ambiguity could be
eliminated quickly because one can approximate volatility locally as in (1.3) and
thus use observations on a short time interval to differentiate between the two
hypotheses. This is possible because of the tight connection between past and
future volatility imposed in each of P σ and P σ. As discussed earlier, this is not
the kind of ambiguity we have in mind. The point of (1.5) is only to illustrate
nonequivalence as simply as possible. Importantly, such nonequivalence of priors
is a feature also of the more complex and interesting cases at which the model is
directed.
An objection to modeling ambiguity about possibility might take the form: “If
distinct priors (or models) are not equivalent, then one can discriminate between
them readily. Therefore, when studying nontransient ambiguity there is no loss
in restricting priors to be equivalent.” The connection between past and future is
again the core issue (as in the preceding subsection). Consider the individual at
time t and her beliefs about the future. The source of ambiguity is her concern
9Two measures P and P ′ on Ω are singular if there exists A ⊂ Ω such that P (A) = 1 and
P ′ (A) = 0. They are equivalent, if for every A, P (A) = 0 if and only if P ′ (A) = 0. Thus P
and P ′ singular implies that they are not equivalent, but the converse is false.
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with locally time varying and poorly understood factors. This limits her confi-
dence in predictions about the immediate future, or ‘next step’, to a degree that
depends on history but that is not eliminated by the retrospective empirical dis-
crimination between models. At a formal level, Epstein and Schneider [24] show
that when backward induction reasoning is added to multiple priors utility, then
the individual behaves as if the set of conditionals entertained at any time t and
state does not vary with marginal prior beliefs on time t measurable uncertainty.
(They call this property rectangularity.) Thus looking back on past observations
at t, even though the individual might be able to dismiss some priors or models
as being inconsistent with the past, this is unimportant for prediction because the
set of conditional beliefs about the future is unaffected.
2. Utility
Many components of the formal setup are typical in continuous time asset pric-
ing. Time t varies over the finite horizon [0, T ]. Paths or trajectories of the
driving process are assumed to be continuous and thus are modeled by elements
of Cd([0, T ]), the set of all Rd-valued continuous functions on [0, T ], endowed with
the sup norm. The generic path is ω = (ωt)t∈[0,T ], where we write ωt instead of
ω (t). All relevant paths begin at 0 and thus we define the canonical state space
to be
Ω =
{
ω = (ωt) ∈ Cd([0, T ]) : ω0 = 0
}
.
The coordinate process (Bt), where Bt(ω) = ωt, is denoted by B. Information
is modeled by the filtration F = {Ft} generated by B. Let P0 be the Wiener
measure on Ω so that B is a Brownian motion under P0.
Consumption processes c take values in C, a convex subset of Rℓ. The objective
is to formulate a suitable utility function on a domainD of consumption processes.
2.1. Recursive Utility under Equivalence
For perspective, we begin by outlining the Chen-Epstein model where there is
ambiguity only about drift. This is the continuous time counterpart of Scenario
2 in Section 1.3.
If P0 describes the individual’s beliefs, then following Duffie and Epstein [20]
utility may be defined by:10
10Below we often suppress c and write Vt instead of Vt (c). The dependence on the state ω is
also frequently suppressed.
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V P0t (c) = E
P0[
∫ T
t
f(cs, V
P0
s )ds | Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.1)
Here V P0t gives the utility of the continuation (cs)s≥t and V
P0
0 is the utility of
the entire process c. The function f is a primitive of the specification, called an
aggregator. The most commonly used aggregator has the form
f (ct, v) = u (ct)− βv, β ≥ 0, (2.2)
which delivers the expected utility specification
Vt (c) = E
P0
[∫ T
t
e−β(s−t) u(cs) ds | Ft
]
. (2.3)
The use of more general aggregators permits a partial separation of risk aversion
from intertemporal substitution.
To admit a concern with model uncertainty, Chen and Epstein replace the
single measure P0 by a set PΘ of measures equivalent to P0. This is done by
specifying a suitable set of densities. For each well-behaved Rd-valued process
θ = (θt), called a density generator, let
zθt ≡ exp
{
−1
2
∫ t
0
| θs |2 ds −
∫ t
0
θ⊤s dBs
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
and let P θ be the probability measure on (Ω,F) with density zθT , that is,
dP θ
dP0
= zθT ; more generally,
dP θ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= zθt for each t. (2.4)
Given a set Θ of density generators, the corresponding set of priors is
PΘ = {P θ : θ ∈ Θ and P θ is defined by (2.4) }. (2.5)
By construction, all measures in PΘ are equivalent to P0. Because the role of P0
is only to define null events, any other member of PΘ could equally well serve as
the reference measure.
Continuation utilities are defined by:
Vt = inf
P∈PΘ
EP [
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs)ds | Ft]. (2.6)
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An important property of the utility process is dynamic consistency, which follows
from the following recursivity: For every c in D,
Vt = min
P∈PΘ
EP
[∫ τ
t
f(cs, Vs) ds + Vτ | Ft
]
, 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ T . (2.7)
Regarding interpretation, by the Girsanov theorem Bt +
∫ t
0
θsds is a Brownian
motion under P θ. Thus as θ varies over Θ and P θ varies over PΘ, alternative
hypotheses about the drift of the driving process are defined. Accordingly, the
infimum suggests that the utility functions Vt exhibit an aversion to ambiguity
about the drift. Because Bt has variance-covariance matrix equal to the identity
according to all measures in PΘ, there is no ambiguity about volatility. Neither
is there any uncertainty about what is possible because P0 defines which events
are null.
There is a limited sense in which the preceding framework is adequate for
modeling also ambiguity about volatility. For example, suppose that the driving
process is (Xt), where dXt = σtdBt, (where B is a Brownian motion under P0
and) where the volatility is thought to evolve according to
dσt = θtdt+ vtdBt.
Here the drift (θt) is ambiguous in the above sense, and the volatility of volatility
(vt) is a fixed stochastic process, for example, it might be constant as in many
stochastic volatility models. Thus the difficulty of finding a specification for (σt)
in which one can have complete confidence is moved one level from volatility to
its volatility. This constitutes progress if there is greater evidence about vol of vol
and if model implications are less sensitive to misspecifications of the latter. We
suspect that in many modeling situations neither is true. Moreover, this approach
cannot intermediate between, or robustify, the stochastic volatility models that
have been used in the empirical literature (Section 1.2).
2.2. The set of priors
The objective is to specify beliefs, in the form of a set of priors generalizing (2.5),
that captures ambiguity about both drift and volatility. Another key ingredient is
conditioning. The nonequivalence of priors (illustrated by (1.5)) poses a particular
difficulty for updating because of the need to update beliefs conditional on events
having zero probability according to some, but not all, priors. Once these steps
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are completed, continuation utilities can be defined (apart from technical details)
as in (2.6); see the next section.
The construction of the set of priors can be understood by referring back
to the binomial and trinomial examples in the introduction. In Scenario 2, the
composition of all urns is specified by fixing µ = (µt) with | µt |≤ κ. Define
Xµ = (Xµt ) by
dXµt = µth+ dBt, X
µ
0 = 0.
Then Xµ and P0 induce a distribution P
µ over trajectories; and as one varies
over all choices of µ, one obtains the set of priors P described earlier. Thus
beliefs are described indirectly through the set {µ = (µt) :| µt |≤ κ} of alternative
hypotheses about the drift of the driving process. Similarly in Scenario 3, where
the composition of all urns is specified by by fixing σ = (σt) with σ ≤ σt ≤ σ. If
Xσ = (Xσt ) is defined by
dXσt = σtdBt, X
σ
0 = 0,
then Xσ and P0 induce a distribution P
σ over trajectories; and as one varies over
all choices of σ, one obtains the set of priors P described earlier. Thus beliefs are
described indirectly through a set of alternative hypotheses about the volatility
of the driving process.
The preceding construction is readily generalized to permit a vector-valued
driving process (d ≥ 1), ambiguity about both drift and volatility, and to allow
ambiguity at any time t to depend on history. We describe the corresponding
construction in continuous time.11
The individual is not certain that the driving process has zero drift and/or
unit variance (where d = 1). Accordingly, she entertains a range of alternative
hypotheses Xθ = (Xθt ) parametrized by θ. Here θt = (µt, σt) is an F -progressively
measurable process with values in Rd×Rd×d that describes a conceivable process
for drift µ = (µt) and for volatility σ = (σt).
12 Available information leads to the
constraint on drift and volatility pairs given by
θt (ω) ∈ Θt (ω) , for all (t, ω) , (2.8)
where Θt (ω) is a subset of R
d ×Rd×d. The Θt’s are primitives of the model.13 In
the trinomial model expanded in the obvious way to include also ambiguity about
11The reader is referred to Epstein and Ji [23] for a general and mathematically rigorous
development.
12Write θ = (µ, σ).
13See our companion paper for the technical regularity conditions assumed for (Θt).
13
drift,
Θt (ω) = [−κ, κ]× [σ, σ], for all (t, ω) .
In general, the dependence of Θt (ω) on the history corresponding to state
ω permits the model to accommodate learning. Moreover, because the form of
history dependence is unrestricted (apart from technical regularity conditions),
so is the nature of learning. Just as in the Chen-Epstein model, we provide a
framework within which additional structure modeling learning can be added.
Two other examples might be helpful. The robust stochastic volatility model
described in the introduction corresponds to taking
Θt (ω) = {0} × [σt (ω) , σt (ω)],
where σt (ω) and σt (ω) are given by (1.1). When d > 1, one way to robustify is
through the restriction
Θt (ω) =
{
σ ∈ Rd×d : σ1t (ω)
(
σ1t (ω)
)⊺ ≤ σσ⊺ ≤ σ2t (ω) (σ2t (ω))⊺} ,
though other natural specifications exist in the multidimensional case.
The model is flexible in the way it relates ambiguity about drift and ambiguity
about volatility. Thus, as a final example, suppose that drift and volatility are
thought to move together. Then joint ambiguity is captured by specifying
Θt(ω) = {(µ, σ) ∈ R2 : µ = µmin + z, σ2 = σ2min + 2z/γ, 0 ≤ z ≤ zt (ω)}, (2.9)
where µmin, σ
2
min and γ > 0 are fixed and known parameters.
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Given a hypothesis θ about drift and volatility, the implication for the driving
process is that it is given by the unique solution Xθ =
(
Xθt
)
to the following
stochastic differential equation (SDE) under P0:
dXθt = µt(X
θ
· )dt+ σt(X
θ
· )dBt, X
θ
0 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.10)
We restrict the process θ further so that a unique strong solution Xθ to the SDE
exists. Denote by Θ the set of all processes θ satisfying the latter and also (2.8).
As in the discrete time examples, Xθ and P0 induce a probability measure P
θ
on (Ω,FT ):
P θ(A) = P0({ω : Xθ(ω) ∈ A}), A ∈ FT . (2.11)
14This specification is adapted from Epstein and Schneider [26].
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Therefore, we arrive at the set PΘ of priors on the set of continuous trajectories
given by
PΘ= {P θ : θ ∈ Θ}. (2.12)
Fix Θ and denote the set of priors simply by P. This set of priors is used, as in the
Gilboa-Schmeidler model, to define utility and guide choice between consumption
processes.
Remark 1. Here is a recap. The set P consists of priors over Ω, the space of
continuous trajectories for the driving process. B denotes the coordinate process,
Bt (ω) = ωt. It is a Brownian motion under P0, which may or may not lie in P, but
B is typically not a Brownian motion relative to (other) priors in P. Indeed, dif-
ferent priors P typically imply different conditional expectations EPt (Bt+△t −Bt)
and EPt (〈B〉t+△t − 〈B〉t). This is the justification for interpreting P as modeling
ambiguity about the drift and volatility of the driving process. The preceding
should be viewed as one way to construct P, but not necessarily as a description
of the individual’s thought processes. The model’s objective is to describe behav-
ior that can be thought of “as if” being derived from a maxmin objective function
using the above set of priors.
The construction of utility requires that first we show how beliefs, through
the set P, lead to natural definitions of “expectation” and “conditional expecta-
tion.” The former is straightforward. For any random variable ξ on (Ω,FT ), if
supP∈P EP ξ <∞, define its (nonlinear) expectation by
Eˆξ = sup
P∈P
EP ξ. (2.13)
Because we will assume that the individual is concerned with worst-case scenarios,
below we use the fact that
inf
P∈P
EP ξ = −Eˆ[−ξ].
Conditional beliefs and expectation are not as clear cut because of the need,
mentioned above, to update beliefs conditional on events having zero probability
according to some priors. A naive approach to defining conditional expectation
would be to use the standard conditional expectation EP [ξ | Ft] for each P in P
and then to take the (essential) supremum over P. Such an approach immedi-
ately encounters a roadblock due to the nonequivalence of priors. The conditional
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expectation EP [ξ | Ft] is well defined only P -almost surely, while speaking infor-
mally, conditional beliefs and expectation must be defined at every node deemed
possible by some prior in P. The economic rationale is simple. Suppose that
P and P ′ are two nonequivalent priors held (for example) at time 0, and con-
sider updating at t > 0. Let A be an event, measurable at time t, such that
P (A) = 0 < P ′ (A). Then A is conceivable according to the individual’s ex ante
perception. Consequently, beliefs at time t conditional on A are relevant both for
ex post choice and also for ex ante choice, for example, if the individual reasons by
backward induction. Therefore, the ex ante perception represented by P should
also be updated there, even though A was deemed impossible ex ante according
to P .
This difficulty can be overcome because for every admissible hypothesis θ,
θt (ω) is defined for every (t, ω), that is, the primitives specify a hypothesized
instantaneous drift-volatility pair everywhere in the tree. This feature of the
model resembles the approach adopted in the theory of extensive form games,
namely the use of conditional probability systems, whereby conditional beliefs at
every node are specified as primitives, obviating the need to update.15 We show
that a solution to the updating problem is also available here (though it requires
nontrivial mathematical arguments - see Epstein and Ji [23] for details, rigorous
statements and supporting proofs).
To outline it, let θ = (θs) be a conceivable scenario ex ante and fix a node
(t, ω). By definition of θ, the continuation of θ is seen by the individual ex ante as
a conceivable continuation from time t along the history ω. We assume that then
it is also seen as a conceivable scenario ex post conditionally on (t, ω), thus ruling
out surprises or unanticipated changes in outlook. Then, paralleling (2.10), each
such conditional scenario has an implication for the driving process conditionally
on (t, ω). The implied process and P0 induce a probability measure P
θ,ω
t on Ω,
denoted simply by P ωt with θ suppressed when it is understood that P = P
θ. The
crucial facts are that, for each P in P, (i) P ωt is defined for every t and ω, and
(ii) P ωt is a version of the regular Ft-conditional probability of P .16 The set of all
15It resembles also the approach in the discrete time model in Epstein and Schneider [24],
where roughly, conditional beliefs about the next instant for every time and history are adopted
as primitives and are pasted together by backward induction to deliver the ex ante set of priors.
16For any probability measure P on the canonical space Ω, a corresponding regular Ft-
conditional probability Pωt is defined to be any mapping P
ω
t : Ω × FT → [0, 1] satisfying the
following conditions: (i) for any ω, Pωt is a probability measure on (Ω,FT ). (ii) for any A ∈ FT ,
ω → Pωt (A) is Ft-measurable. (iii) for any A ∈ FT , EP [1A | Ft](ω) = Pωt (A), P -a.s.
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such conditionals obtained as θ varies over Θ is denoted Pωt , that is,
Pωt = {P ωt : P ∈ P} . (2.14)
We take Pωt to be the individual’s set of priors conditional on (t, ω). Then, the
conditional expectation of suitable random variables ξ is defined by
Eˆ[ξ | Ft] (ω) = sup
P∈Pω
t
EP ξ, for every (t, ω).
This completes the prerequisites regarding beliefs for defining utility.
2.3. The definition of utility
Let D be a domain of consumption processes and defer elaboration until the next
section. For each c in D, define its continuation utility Vt (c), or simply Vt, by
Vt = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs)ds | Ft] . (2.15)
This definition parallels the Chen and Epstein definition (2.6). In particular, f
is an aggregator that is assumed to satisfy suitable measurability, Lipschitz and
integrability conditions. Under these conditions and for a suitable domain D,
there is a unique utility process (Vt (c)) solving (2.15) for each c in D, that is,
utility is well-defined.
For the standard aggregator (2.2), utility admits the closed-form expression
Vt (c) = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
u(cs)e
−βsds | Ft]. (2.16)
More generally, closed-from expressions are rare.
The following example illustrates the effect of volatility ambiguity.
Example 2.1 (Closed form). Suppose that there is no ambiguity about the
drift, and that ambiguity about volatility is captured by the fixed interval [σ, σ] ⊂
R++. Consider consumption processes that are certain and constant, at level 0
for example, on the time interval [0, 1), and that yield constant consumption on
[1, T ] at a level that depends on the state ω1 at time 1. Specifically, let
ct(ω) = ψ(ω1), for 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
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where ψ : R1 → R1+. For simplicity, suppose further that u is linear. Then time 0
utility evaluated using (2.16), is, ignoring irrelevant constants,
V0 = −Eˆ[−ψ(ω1)].
If ψ is a convex function, then17
V0 (c) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ψ(σ2y) exp(−y2
2
)dy,
and if ψ is concave, then
V0 (c) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ψ(σ¯2y) exp(−y2
2
)dy. (2.17)
There is an intuitive interpretation for these formulae. Given risk neutrality, the
individual cares only about the expected value of consumption at time 1. The
issue is expectation according to which probability law? For simplicity, consider
the following concrete specifications:
ψ1 (x) =| x− κ | , and ψ2 (x) = − | x− κ | .
Then ψ1 is convex and ψ2 is concave. If we think of the the driving process as
the price of a stock, then ψ1(·) can be interpreted as a straddle - the sum of a
European put and a European call option on the stock at the common strike price
κ and expiration date 1. (We are ignoring nonnegativity constraints.) A straddle
pays off if the stock price moves, whether up or down, and thus constitutes a bet
on volatility. Accordingly, the worst case scenario is that the price process has the
lowest possible volatility σ. In that case, ω1 is N (0, σ
2) and the indicated expected
value of consumption follows. Similarly, ψ2 (·) describes the corresponding short
position and amounts to a bet against volatility. Therefore, the relevant volatility
for its worst case evaluation is the largest possible value σ, consistent with the
expression for utility given above.
When the function ψ is neither concave nor convex globally, closed-form ex-
pressions for utility are available only in extremely special and unrevealing cases.
However, a generalization to d-dimensional processes, d ≥ 1, is available and will
be used below. Let there be certainty that the driving process is a martingale and
let the volatility matrix σt in (2.10) be restricted to lie in the compact and convex
17See Levy et al. [38] and Peng [47].
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set Γ ⊂ Rd×d such that, for all σ in Γ, σσ⊤ ≥ aˆ for some positive definite matrix
â. Consumption is as above except that, for some a ∈ Rd,
ct(ω) = ψ(a
⊤ω1), for 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Let σ be any solution to minσ∈Γ tr
(
σσ⊤aa⊤
)
and let σ be any solution to
maxσ∈Γ tr
(
σσ⊤aa⊤
)
. If ψ is convex (concave), then the worst-case scenario is that
σt =σ (σ) for all t. Closed-form expressions for utility follow immediately.
The domain D of consumption processes, and the ambient space containing
utility processes, are defined precisely in our companion paper (see also the next
section). Here we mention briefly a feature of these definitions that reveals a great
deal about the nature of formal analysis when priors are not equivalent. When
the ambient framework is a probability space (Ω, P0), and thus P0 is used to define
null events, then random variables and stochastic processes are defined only up to
the P0-almost sure qualification. Thus P0 is an essential part of the definition of
all formal domains. However, ambiguity about volatility leads to a set P of priors
that do not agree about which events have zero probability. Therefore, we follow
Denis and Martini [15] and define appropriate domains of stochastic processes by
using the entire set of probability measures P. Accordingly, two consumption
processes c′ and c are identified, and we write c′ = c, if for every t, c′t (ω) = ct (ω)
for every ω in Gt ⊂ Ω, where P (Gt) = 1 for all P in P.18 We abbreviate the
preceding in the form: for every t,
c′t = ct P-a.s.
Loosely put, the latter means that the two processes are certain to yield identical
consumption levels regardless of which prior in P is the true law describing the
driving process. Put another way, a consumption process as defined formally
herein is portrayed in greater detail than if it were seen from the perspective of
18The following perspective may be helpful for nonspecialists in continuous time analysis.
In the classical case of a probability space (Ω,F , P ) with filtration {Ft}, if two processes
X and Y satisfy “for each t, Xt = Yt P -a.s.”, then Y is called a modification of X . If
P ({ω : Xt = Yt ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}) = 1, then X and Y are said to be indistinguishable. These notions
are equivalent when restricted to X and Y having a.s. right continuous sample paths, but the
second is stronger in general. We point out, however, that the sense in which one constructs a
Brownian motion exhibiting continuous sample paths is that a suitable modification exists (see
the Kolmogorov-Centsov Theorem). A reference for the preceding is Karatzas and Shreve [37,
pp. 2, 53].
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any single prior in P. For example, if the two priors P1 and P2 are singular, then
each provides a description of consumption on a subset Ωi, i = 1, 2, of the set of
possible trajectories of the driving process, where Ω1 and Ω2 are disjoint, while
using the entire set P yields a description of consumption on Ω1 ∪ Ω2 and more.
Remark 2. If every two priors are singular, then the statement c′t = ct P-
a.s. amounts to standard probability 1 statements on disjoint parts of the state
space, and thus is not far removed from a standard equation in random variables.
However, singularity is not representative - it can be shown that the set P typically
contains priors that, though not equivalent, are also not mutually singular. Thus
the reader is urged not to be overly influenced by the example of singular priors
which we use often only because it starkly illustrates nonequivalence.
Equations involving processes other than consumption processes are given sim-
ilar meanings. For example, the equality (2.15) should be understood to hold
P-almost surely for each t. Similar meaning is given also to inequalities.
Utility has a range of natural properties. Most noteworthy is that the process
(Vt) satisfies the recursive relation
Vt = − Ê
[
−
∫ τ
t
f(cs, Vs) ds − Vτ | Ft
]
, 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ T. (2.18)
Such recursivity is typically thought to imply dynamic consistency. However, the
nonequivalence of priors complicates matters as we describe next.
The noted recursivity does imply the following weak form of dynamic consis-
tency: For any 0 < τ < T , and any two consumption processes c′ and c that
coincide on [0, τ ],
[Vτ (c
′) ≥ Vτ (c) P-a.s.] =⇒ V0 (c′) ≥ V0 (c) .
Typically, (see Duffie and Epstein [20, p. 373] for example), dynamic consistency
is defined so as to deal also with strict rankings, that is, if also Vτ (c
′) > Vτ (c) on a
“non-negligible” set of states, then V0 (c
′) > V0 (c). This added requirement rules
out the possibility that c′ is chosen ex ante though it is indifferent to c, and yet
it is not implemented fully because the individual switches to the conditionally
strictly preferable c for some states at time τ . The issue is how to specify “non-
negligible”. When all priors are equivalent, then positive probability according to
any single prior is the natural specification. However, in the absence of equivalence
a similarly natural specification is unclear. A simple illustration of the consequence
is given in the next example.
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Example 2.2 (Weak Dynamic Consistency). Take d = 1. Let the endow-
ment process e satisfy (under P0)
d log et = σtdBt,
or equivalently,
det/et =
1
2
σ2t dt+ σtdBt P0-a.s.
Here volatility is restricted only by 0 < σ ≤ σt ≤ σ. Utility is defined, for any
consumption process c, by
V0 (c) = inf
P∈P
EP
[∫ T
0
e−βtu (ct) dt
]
= inf
P∈P
[∫ T
0
e−βtEPu (ct) dt
]
,
where
u (ct) = (ct)
α/α, α < 0.
Denote by P ∗ the prior in P corresponding to σt = σ for all t; that is, P ∗ is the
measure on Ω induced by X∗,
X∗t = σBt, for all t and ω.
Then
V0 (e) = E
P ∗
[∫ T
0
e−βsu (et) dt
]
.
(This is because u (et) = α
−1 exp (α log et) and because α < 0 makes x 7−→ eαx/α
concave, so that the argument in Example 2.1 can be adapted.)
Define the nonnegative continuous function ϕ on R by
ϕ(x) =


1 x ≤ σ2
2x
σ2−σ2
− σ2+σ2
σ2−σ2
σ2 < x < σ
2+σ2
2
0 σ
2+σ2
2
≤ x
Fix τ > 0. Define the event Nτ by Nτ = {ω : 〈B〉τ = σ2τ}, and the consumption
process c by
ct =
{
et 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
et + ϕ(〈B〉τ/τ) τ ≤ t ≤ T
Then Vτ (c) ≥ Vτ (e) P-almost surely and a strict preference prevails onNτ because
ϕ(σ2) = 1 and P σ(Nτ ) = 1. However, c is indifferent to e at time 0 because
ϕ(〈B〉τ/τ) = ϕ(σ2) = 0 under P ∗.
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In the asset pricing application below we focus on dynamic behavior (and
equilibria) where ex ante optimal plans are implemented for all time P-almost
surely. This requires that we examine behavior from conditional perspectives and
not only ex ante. Accordingly, if the feasible set in the above example is {e, c},
the predicted choice would be c.
3. Asset Returns
This section describes some implications of ambiguous volatility for asset pric-
ing theory. First, we describe what can be said about prices based on hedging
arguments, without assuming preference maximization or equilibrium. It is well
known that ambiguous volatility leads to market incompleteness (see Avellaneda
et al. [2], for example) and hence that perfect hedging is generally impossible. Ac-
cordingly, hedging arguments lead only to interval predictions of security prices
which adds to the motivation for considering preferences and equilibrium. We
explore such an equilibrium approach by employing the utility functions defined
above and a representative agent setup. The main result is a version of the C-
CAPM that applies when volatility is ambiguous. As an illustration of the added
explanatory power of the model, it can rationalize the well documented feature
of option prices whereby the Black-Scholes implied volatility exceeds the realized
volatility of the underlying security.
In received theory, there exist positive “state-prices” that characterize arbitrage-
free and equilibrium prices in the familiar way.19 In the standard setup where null
events are defined by a reference (physical or subjective) measure, state prices are
often used as densities to define a risk neutral or martingale measure. Densities do
not apply when priors disagree about what is possible. But, surprisingly perhaps,
suitable state prices can still be derived.
There is a literature on the pricing of derivative securities when volatility is
ambiguous. The problem was first studied by Lyons [41] and Avellaneda et al. [2];
recent explorations include Denis and Martini [15], Cont [13] and Vorbrink [55].20
They employ hedging arguments to derive upper and lower bounds on security
prices. However, our Theorem 3.1 is the first to characterize these price bounds in
19We do not treat arbitrage formally. However, at an informal level we identify no-arbitrage
prices with those produced by Black-Scholes-style hedging arguments because of their intuitive
connection and because of the formal connection that is familiar in the standard ambiguity-free
model (Duffie [19]).
20These papers often refer to uncertain volatility rather than to ambiguous volatility.
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terms of state prices. In addition, we study a Lucas-style endowment economy and
thus take the endowment as the basic primitive, while the cited papers take the
prices of primitive securities as given. We are not aware of any previous studies
of equilibrium in continuous time with ambiguous volatility.
Our asset market analysis is conducted under the assumption that there is
ambiguity only about volatility and that the volatility matrix σt is restricted by:
σt (ω) ∈ Γ, for each t and ω, (3.1)
where Γ ⊂ Rd×d is compact and convex and, for all σ in Γ, σσ⊤ ≥ aˆ for some
positive definite matrix â. (In the one-dimensional case, Γ = [σ, σ] with σ > 0;
Examples 2.1 and 2.2 both use this specification.). The trinomial example in
Section 1.3 is the discrete time one-dimensional counterpart. The formal model is
due to Peng [45], who calls itG-Brownian motion, which is, loosely put, “Brownian
motion with ambiGuous volatility.” We adopt this terminology and thus refer to
the coordinate process B as being a G-Brownian motion under P. Importantly,
much of the machinery of stochastic calculus, including generalizations of Itoˆ’s
Lemma and Itoˆ integration, has been extended to the framework of G-Brownian
motion (see Appendix A for brief descriptions). This machinery is used in the
proofs. However, the proof ‘ideas’ are standard, for example, they exploit Itoˆ’s
Lemma and a martingale representation theorem. The difficulty is only to know
when and in precisely what form such tools apply. The statements of results do
not rely on this formal material and are easy to understand if one accepts that
they differ from standard theory primarily through the use of a new (nonadditive)
notion of conditional expectation and the substitution of “P-almost surely” for
the usual almost surely qualification.
In order to state the asset pricing results precisely, we need to be more precise
about the formal domains for random variables and stochastic processes. They
differ from the usual domains (only) because of the nonequivalence of priors.
Random payoffs occurring at a single instant are taken to be bounded continuous
functions of the state or suitable limits of such functions. Formally, define the
space L̂2(Ω) to be the completion, under the norm ‖ ξ ‖≡ (Eˆ[| ξ |2]) 12 , of the set
of all bounded continuous functions on Ω. Then L̂2(Ω) is a subset of the set of
measurable random variables ξ for which supP∈P E
P (| ξ |2) <∞.21 For processes,
21It contains many discontinuous random variables. For example, L̂2(Ω) contains every
bounded and lower semicontinuous function on Ω (see our companion paper).
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define M2,0 to be the class of processes η of the form
ηt(ω) =
N−1∑
i=0
ξi(ω)1[ti,ti+1)(t),
where ξi ∈ L̂2(Ω), 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, and 0 = t0 < · · · < tN = T . Roughly, each
such η is a step function in random variables from L̂2(Ω). For the usual technical
reasons, we consider also suitable limits of such processes. Thus the ambient space
for processes, denoted M2, is taken to be the completion of M2,0 under the norm
‖ η ‖M2≡ (Eˆ[
∫ T
0
| ηt |2 dt]) 12 .
If, for every t, Zt = 0 P-a.s., then Z = 0 in M2 (because Eˆ[
∫ T
0
| Zt |2 dt] ≤∫ T
0
Eˆ[| Zt |2]dt = 0), but the converse is not valid in general. The consumption
processes (ct) and utility processes (Vt (c)) discussed above, as well as all processes
below related to asset markets, are taken to lie in M2.
The domain M2 depends on the set of priors P, and hence also on set Γ from
(3.1) that describes volatility ambiguity. If ambiguity about volatility increases
in the sense that Γ is replaced by Γ∗, Γ ⊂ Γ∗, then it is easy to see that the
corresponding domain of processes shrinks, that is,
Γ ⊂ Γ∗ =⇒M2∗ ⊂M2. (3.2)
The reason is that when ambiguity increases, processes are required to be well
behaved (square integrable, for example) with respect to more probability laws.
3.1. Hedging and state prices
Consider the following market environment. There is a single consumption good,
a riskless asset with return rt and d risky securities available in zero net supply.
Returns Rt to the risky securities are given by
dRt = btdt+ stdBt, (3.3)
where st is a d × d invertible volatility matrix. Both (bt) and (st) are known by
the investor.22 Define ηt = s
−1
t (bt − rt1), the market price of uncertainty (a more
22bt and st are functions on Ω, the set of possible trajectories for the driving process. It is
these functions that are known. The trajectory is, of course, uncertain and known only at T .
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appropriate term here than market price of risk). It is assumed henceforth that
(rt) is a bounded process in M
2; a restriction on the market price of risk will be
given below.
It is important to understand the significance of the assumption that the re-
turns equation holds P-almost surely, that is, P -a.s. for every prior in P. Because
we are excluding ambiguity about drift, each prior P corresponds to an admissible
hypothesis (σt) for volatility via (2.10) and (2.11). Thus write P = P
(σt). Then,
taking d = 1 for simplicity,
〈R〉t =
∫ t
0
s2τd〈B〉τ =
∫ t
0
s2τσ
2
τdτ P
(σt)-a.s.
In general, the prior implied by an alternative hypothesis (σ′t) is not equivalent
to P (σt), which means that P (σ
′
t
) and P (σt) yield different views of the quadratic
variation of returns. Consequently, the volatility of returns is ambiguous: it is
certain only that 〈R〉t lies in the interval
[
σ2
∫ t
0
s2τdτ, σ
2
∫ t
0
s2τdτ
]
.
Similarly, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the P-almost sure qualification
should be understood to apply to all other equations (and inequalities) below
even where not stated; and its significance can be understood along the same
lines.
Fix the dividend stream denoted (δ, δT ), where δt is the dividend for 0 ≤ t < T
and δT is the lumpy dividend paid at the terminal time; formally, (δ, δT ) ∈M2 ×
L̂2(Ω) . For a given time τ , consider the following law of motion for wealth on
[τ, T ]:
dYt = (rtYt + η
⊤
t φt − δt)dt+ φ⊤t dBt, (3.4)
Yτ = y,
where y is initial wealth, φt = Yts
⊤
t ψt, and (ψt) is the trading strategy, that is,
ψti is the proportion of wealth invested in risky security i. (By nonsingularity of
st, choice of a trading strategy can be expressed equivalently in terms of choice
of (φt), which reformulation is simplifying.) Denote the unique solution by Y
y,φ,τ .
Define the superhedging set
Uτ = {y ≥ 0 | ∃φ ∈M2 s.t. Y y,φ,τT ≥ δT},
and the superhedging price Sτ = inf{y | y ∈ Uτ}. Similarly define the subhedging
set
Lτ = {y ≥ 0 | ∃φ ∈M2 s.t. Y −y,φ,τT ≥ −δT }
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and the subhedging price Sτ = sup{y | y ∈ Lτ}.
The relevance of ambiguity about volatility is apparent once one realizes that
the law of motion (3.4), and also the inequalities at T that define Uτ and Lτ , should
be understood to hold P-almost surely. Thus, for example, a superhedging trading
strategy must deliver δt on [0, T ) and also at least δT at T for all realizations that
are conceiveable according to some prior. Speaking loosely, the need to satisfy
many nonequivalent priors in this way makes superhedging difficult (Uτ small) and
the superhedging price large. Similarly, ambiguity reduces the subhedging price.
Hence the price interval is made larger by ambiguous volatility. More precisely,
by the preceding argument, (3.2) and using the obvious notation,
Γ ⊂ Γ∗ =⇒
[
S0, S0
] ⊂ [S∗0, S∗0] .
Thus an increase in volatility weakens the implications for price of a hedging
argument and naturally bolsters the case for pursuing an equilibrium analysis,
which we do after characterizing super and subhedging prices.
We show that both of the above prices can be characterized using appropriately
defined state prices. Let
vt = lim
ε↓0
1
ε
(〈B〉t − 〈B〉t−ε), (3.5)
where lim is taken componentwise.23 Under P0, B is a Brownian motion and
vt equals the d × d identity matrix P0-a.s. Importantly, we can also describe vt
as seen through the lense of any other prior in P: if P = P (σt) is a prior in P
corresponding via the SDE (2.10) to (σt), then
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vt = σtσ
⊤
t dt× P (σt)-a.s. (3.6)
It is assumed henceforth that (v−1t ηt) is a bounded process in M
2.25
23In this we are following Soner et. al. [53]. The quadratic variation process 〈B〉 is defined in
(1.3); vt(ω) takes values in S
>0
d , the space of all d× d positive-definite matrices.
24Here is the proof: By Soner et al. [53, p. 4], 〈B〉 equals the quadratic variation of B P (σt)-
a.s.; and by Oksendal [44, p. 56], the quadratic variation of
t∫
0
σsdBs equals
t∫
0
σsσ
⊤
s ds P
(σt)-a.s.
Thus we have the P (σt)-a.s. equality in processes 〈B〉 =
(
t∫
0
σsσ
⊤
s ds
)
. Because 〈B〉 is absolutely
continuous, its time derivative exists a.s. on [0, T ]; indeed, the derivative at t is vt. Evidently,
d
dt
t∫
0
σsσ
⊤
s ds = σtσ
⊤
t for almost every t. Equation (3.6) follows.
25This restriction will be confirmed below whenever η is taken to be endogenous.
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By the state price process we mean the unique solution pi = (pit) to
dpit/pit = −rtdt− η⊤t v−1t dBt, pi0 = 1, (3.7)
which admits a closed form expression paralleling the classical case:26
pit = exp{−
∫ t
0
rsds−
∫ t
0
η⊤s v
−1
s dBs − 12
∫ t
0
η⊤s v
−1
s ηsds}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (3.8)
We emphasize the important fact that pi is ‘universal’ in the sense of being defined
almost surely for every prior in P. More explicitly, pi satisfies: for every t,
pit = exp{−
∫ t
0
rsds−
∫ t
0
η⊤s
(
σsσ
⊤
s
)−1
dBs − 12
∫ t
0
η⊤s
(
σsσ
⊤
s
)−1
ηsds}, P (σt)-a.s.
Roughly speaking, this defines pit (ω) for every trajectory ω of the driving process
that is possible according to at least one prior in P.27
Our characterization of superhedging and subhedging prices requires an addi-
tional arguably minor restriction on the security market. To express it, for any
ε > 0, define
L̂2+ε(Ω) =
{
ξ ∈ L̂2(Ω) : Eˆ[| ξ |2+ε] <∞
}
.
The restriction is that pi and δ satisfy
(piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt) ∈ L̂2+ε(Ω). (3.9)
Theorem 3.1 (Hedging prices). Fix a dividend stream (δ, δT ) ∈M2 × L̂2(Ω).
Suppose that r and (v−1t ηt) are bounded processes inM
2 and that (3.9) is satisfied.
Then the superhedging and subhedging prices at any time τ are given by (P-a.s.)
Sτ = Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt+
piT
piτ
δT | Fτ ]
and
Sτ = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt− piT
piτ
δT | Fτ ].
26Apply Peng [47, Ch. 5, Remark 1.3].
27Roughly speaking, pit is defined on the union of the supports of all priors in P . Because
these supports need not be pairwise disjoint, it is not obvious that such a ‘universal’ definition
exists. But (3.5) and (3.6) ensure that pit is well defined even where supports overlap.
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In the special case where the security δ can be perfectly hedged, that is, there
exist y and φ such that Y y,φ,0T = δT , then
S0 = S0 = Eˆ[piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt] = −Eˆ[−piT δT −
∫ T
0
pitδtdt].
Because this asserts equality of the supremum and infimum of expected values of
piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt as the measures P vary over P, it follows that
EP [piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt] is constant for all such measures P , that is, the hedging
price is unambiguous. In the further specialization where there is no ambiguity
and P0 is the single prior, one obtains pricing by an equivalent martingale measure
whose density (on Ft) with respect to P0 is pit.
Remark 3. Vorbrink [55] obtains an analogous characterization of hedging prices
under the assumption of G-Brownian motion. However, in place of our assumption
(3.9), he adopts the strong assumption that bt = rt, so that the market price of
uncertainty ηt vanishes and pit = exp{−
∫ t
0
rsds}.
Example 3.2 (Closed form hedging prices). We derive the super and sub-
hedging prices of a European call option in a special case and compare the results
with the standard Black-Scholes formula.
Let there be one risky security (d = 1) with price (St) satisfying
dSt/St = dRt = btdt+ stdBt.
Suppose further that rt ≡ r, st ≡ 1 and bt − r = bvt, where b > 0 and r are
constants. Thus the market price of uncertainty is given by ηt = bvt, that is,
using (3.6),
ηt = bσ
2
t dt× P (σt)-a.s.
It follows that state prices are given, P-almost surely, by
pit = exp{−rt− bBt − 12b2〈B〉t}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Consider a European call option on the risky security that matures at date T
and has exercise price K. The super and subhedging prices at t can be written in
the form c(St, t) and c(St, t) respectively. At the maturity date,
c(ST , T ) = c(ST , T ) = max[0, ST −K] ≡ Φ(ST ).
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By Theorem 3.1,
c(St, t) = Eˆ[
piT
pit
Φ(ST ) | Ft]
and
c(St, t) = −Eˆ[−piT
pit
Φ(ST ) | Ft].
By the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula in Peng [47], we obtain the following
Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation:28
∂tc+ sup
σ≤σ≤σ
{1
2
σ2S2∂SSc}+ rS∂Sc− rc = 0, c(S, T ) = Φ(S)
and
∂tc− sup
σ≤σ≤σ
{−1
2
σ2S2∂SSc}+ rS∂Sc− rc = 0, c(S, T ) = Φ(S).
Because Φ(·) is convex, so is c(·, t).29 It follows that the respective suprema in the
above equations are achieved at σ and σ, and we obtain
∂tc+
1
2
σ2S2∂SSc+ rS∂Sc− rc = 0, c(S, T ) = Φ(S)
and
∂tc+
1
2
σ2S2∂SSc+ rS∂Sc− rc = 0, c(S, T ) = Φ(S).
Therefore,
c(S, t) = EP
σ
[
piT
pit
Φ(ST )) | Ft]
and
c(S, t) = EP
σ
[
piT
pit
Φ(ST ) | Ft].
In other words, the super and subhedging prices are the Black-Scholes prices with
volatilities σ and σ respectively.
It is noteworthy that in contrast to this effect of volatility ambiguity, the
arbitrage-free price of a European call option is unaffected by ambiguity about
drift. This might be expected because the Black-Scholes price does not depend on
the drift of the underlying. Nevertheless some supporting detail may be useful.
Let the security price be given as above by
dSt/St = dRt = (b+ r)dt+ dBt, P0-a.s.
28They reduce to the standard Black-Scholes equation if σ= σ.
29The argument is analogous to that in the classical Black-Scholes analysis.
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Model drift ambiguity by a set of priors as described in Section 2.1. Each alterna-
tive hypothesis θ = ((µt), 1) about the drift generates a prior P
θ constructed as in
(2.10) and (2.11). By the Girsanov Theorem, Xθt =
∫ τ
0
(µtdt+ dBt) is a standard
Brownian motion under probability P θ. Therefore,
dSt/St = (b+ r)dt+ dX
θ
t , P
θ-a.s.
and the security price follows the identical geometric Brownian motion under P θ.
Similarly, the counterpart of the wealth accumulation equation (3.4) gives
dYt = (rYt + ηφt)dt+ φtdX
θ
t , P
θ-a.s.
where η = b − r. Together, the latter two equations imply that the identical
Black-Scholes price would prevail for the option regardless if P0 or P
θ were the
true probability law. Because θ is an arbitrary hypothesis about drift, it can be
shown that the option price is unaffected by ambiguity about drift.
In fact, the irrelevance of ambiguity about drift is valid much more generally.
Let there be d risky securities whose prices St ∈ Rd solve a stochastic differential
equation of the form
dSt = b̂t (St) dt+ ŝt (St) dBt,
where b̂t and ŝt are given R
d-valued suitably well-behaved functions (for example,
each ŝt (·) is everywhere invertible). Let the instantaneous return to the riskless
security be rt (St). Finally, let the continuous function ψ : R
d → R determine the
payoff ψ (ST ) at time T of a derivative security. Under P0, when B is standard
Brownian motion, the arbitrage-free price of the derivative is defined by the Black-
Scholes PDE (see Duffie [19, Ch. 5], for example). The fact that the drift b̂t does
not enter into the PDE suggests that ambiguity about drift does not affect the
price of the derivative. Further intuition follows as above from the Girsanov
Theorem.30 This argument covers all the usual European options.31 In contrast,
30For any alternative hypothesis θ = ((µt), 1) and corresponding prior P
θ, the security price
process satisfies
dSt = b̂t (St) dt+ ŝt (St) dX
θ
t , P
θ-a.s.,
where Xθt =
∫ τ
0 (µtdt+dBt) is a standard Brownian motion under P
θ. Therefore, all conceivable
truths P θ imply the identical price for the derivative, and ambiguity about drift has no effect.
Further, the corresponding hedging strategy is also unaffected. A rigorous proof is readily
constructed. We do not provide it because ambiguity about drift alone is not our focus.
31It is not difficult to show by a similar argument that the arbitrage-free price of Asian options
is also unaffected by ambiguity about drift.
30
as illustrated by the example of a European call option, ambiguity about volatility
does matter (the price interval in Theorem 3.1 is typically nondegenerate). This
is not surprising given the known importance of volatility in option pricing. More
formally, the difference from the case of drift arises because for an alternative
hypothesis θ = (0, (σt)) for volatility,
(
Xθt
)
satisfying dXθt = σtdBt is not a
standard Brownian motion under P θ.
3.2. Equilibrium
Here we use state prices to study equilibrium in a representative agent economy
with sequential security markets.
In the sequel, we limit ourselves to scalar consumption at every instant so that
C ⊂ R+. At the same time we generalize utility to permit lumpy consumption at
the terminal time. Thus we use the utility functions Vt given by
Vt (c, ξ) = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c, ξ))ds− u (ξ) | Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
where (c, ξ) varies over a subset D of M2 × L̂2(Ω). Here c denotes the absolutely
continuous component of the consumption process and ξ is the lump of consump-
tion at T . Our analysis of utility extends to this larger domain in a straightforward
way.
When considering (c, ξ), it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to versions of c for which cT = ξ. With this normalization, we can abbreviate
(c, ξ) = (c, cT ) by c and identify c with an element of M
2 × L̂2(Ω). Accordingly
write Vt (c, ξ) more simply as Vt (c), where
32
Vt (c) = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c))ds− u (cT ) | Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (3.10)
The agent’s endowment is given by the process e. Define pie = (piet ), called a
32We assume the following conditions for f and u. (1) f and u are continuously differ-
entiable and concave. (2) There exists κ > 0 such that| uc(c) |< κ (1 + c) for all c ∈ C,
and sup {| fc(c, V ) |, | f(c, 0) |} < κ (1 + c) for all (c, V ) ∈ C × R. A consequence is that if
c ∈M2 × L̂2(Ω), then u (cT ) , uc (cT ) ∈ L̂2(Ω) and f (ct, 0) , fc (ct, Vt (c)) ∈M2.
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supergradient at e, by
piet = exp
(∫ t
0
fv (es, Vs (e)) ds
)
fc (et, Vt (e)) , 0 ≤ t < T , (3.11)
pieT = exp
(∫ T
0
fv (es, Vs (e)) ds
)
uc (eT ) .
Securities, given by (3.3) and available in zero net supply, are traded in order
to finance deviations from the endowment process e. Denote the trading strategy
by (ψt), where ψti is the proportion of wealth invested in risky security i. Then
wealth Yt evolves according to the equation
dYt = (rtYt + η
⊤
t φt − (ct − et))dt+ φ⊤t dBt, (3.12)
Y0 = 0, cT = eT + YT ≥ 0,
where ηt = s
−1
t (bt − rt1) and φt = Yts⊤t ψt. We remind the reader that, by nonsin-
gularity of st, choice of a trading strategy can be expressed equivalently in terms
of choice of (φt).
Refer to c as being feasible if c ∈ D and there exists φ in M2 such that (3.12)
is satisfied. More generally, for any 0 ≤ τ ≤ T , consider an individual with initial
wealth Yτ who trades securities and consumes during the period [τ, T ]. Say that c
is feasible on [τ, T ] given initial wealth Yτ if (3.12) is satisfied on [τ, T ] and wealth
at τ is Yτ . Because (3.12) should be understood as being satisfied P -almost surely
for every prior in P, greater ambiguity about volatility tightens the feasibility
restriction (paralleling the discussion in the previous section).
State prices can be used to characterize feasible consumption plans as described
next.
Theorem 3.3 (State prices). Define pi ∈ M2 by (3.8) and let 0 ≤ τ < T .
(i) If c is feasible on [τ, T ] given initial wealth Yτ , then, P-a.s.,
Yτ = Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
(ct − et)dt+ piT
piτ
(cT − eT ) | Fτ ] (3.13)
= −Eˆ[−
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
(ct − et)dt− piT
piτ
(cT − eT ) | Fτ ].
(ii) Conversely, suppose that (3.13) is satisfied and that cT ≥ 0. Then c is
feasible on [τ, T ] given initial wealth Yτ .
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When relevant processes are ambiguity-free diffusions, Cox and Huang [14]
show that state prices can be used to transform a dynamic process of budget
constraints into a single static budget constraint. The theorem provides a coun-
terpart for our setting: for any given τ and initial wealth Yτ , feasibility on [τ, T ]
may be described by the ‘expected’ expenditure constraint (3.13). Because both
(3.12) and (3.13) must be understood to hold P-almost surely, speaking loosely,
the equivalence between the dynamic and static budget constraints is satisfied
simultaneously for all hypotheses (σt) satisfying (3.1).
Perhaps surprisingly, (3.13) contains two (generalized) expectations. Their
conjunction can be interpreted as in the discussion following Theorem 3.1: in
expected value terms any feasible consumption plan unambiguously (that is, for
every prior) exhausts initial wealth when consumption is priced using pi. Such
an interpretation is evident when τ = 0; a similar interpretation can be justified
when τ > 0.
Turn to equilibrium. Say that (e, (rt, ηt)) is a sequential equilibrium if for every
c: For each τ , P-almost surely,
c ∈ Υτ (0) =⇒ Vτ (c) ≤ Vτ (e) .
Thus equilibrium requires not only that the endowment e be optimal at time 0,
but also that it remain optimal at any later time given that e has been followed
to that point.
The main result of this section follows.
Theorem 3.4 (Sequential Equilibrium I). Define pi, pie ∈ M2 by (3.8) and
(3.11) respectively, and assume that P-almost surely,
piet /pi
e
0 = pit. (3.14)
Then (e, (rt, ηt)) is a sequential equilibrium.
Condition (3.14) is in the spirit of the Duffie and Skiadas [22] approach to
equilibrium analysis (see also Skiadas [49] for a comprehensive overview of this
approach). Speaking informally, the process pie/pie0 describes marginal rates of sub-
stitution at e, while pi describes trade-offs offered by the market. Their equality
relates the riskless rate and the market price of risk to consumption and continu-
ation utility through the equation
dpiet/pi
e
t = −rtdt− η⊤t v−1t dBt.
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To be more explicit, suppose that e satisfies
det/et = µ
e
tdt+ (s
e
t )
⊤dBt.
Consider also two specific aggregators. For the standard aggregator (2.2),
piet = exp (−βt) uc (et) , 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (3.15)
Then Ito’s Lemma for G-Brownian motion (Appendix A) and (3.6) imply that
bt − rt1 = stηt = −
(
etucc(et)
uc(et)
)
stσtσ
⊤
t s
e
t , P
(σt)-a.s. (3.16)
which is a version of the C-CAPM for our setting.33 From the perspective of the
measure P0 according to which the coordinate process B is a Brownian motion,
σtσ
⊤
t is the identity matrix and one obtains the usual C-CAPM. However, speaking
informally, the equation (3.16) relates excess returns to consumption also along
trajectories that are consistent with alternative hypotheses (σt) about the nature
of the driving process.
The other case is the so-called Kreps-Porteus aggregator (Duffie and Epstein
[20]). Let
f(c, v) =
cρ − β(αv)ρ/α
ρ(αv)(ρ−α)/α
, (3.17)
where β ≥ 0 and 0 6= ρ, α ≤ 1; (1− α) is the measure of relative risk aversion
and (1− ρ)−1 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To evaluate terminal
lumpy consumption as in (3.10), we take
u (ct) = (ct)
α/α, 0 6= α < 1.
The implied version of the C-CAPM is
bt − rt1 = ρ−1[α(1− ρ)stσtσ⊤t set + (ρ− α)stσtσ⊤t sM ], P (σt)-a.s. (3.18)
where sM is the volatility of wealth in the sense that
dYt/Yt = b
Mdt+ (sM)⊤dBt, P-a.s.
In the absence of ambiguity where P0 alone represents beliefs, then (3.18) reduces
to the two-factor model of excess returns derived by Duffie and Epstein [21].
Equation (3.18) is derived in Appendix B.4, which also presents a result for
general aggregators.
33Equality here (and in similar equations below) means that the two processes (bt − rt1) and
(−
(
etucc(et)
uc(et)
)
stσtσ
⊤
t s
e
t ) are equal as processes in M
2. Notice also that v−1t ηt = −
(
etucc(et)
uc(et)
)
set ,
yielding a process in M2 and thus confirming our prior assumption on security markets.
34
3.3. Minimizing priors
Equation (3.14) is a sufficient condition for sequential equilibrium. Here we de-
scribe an alternative route to equilibrium that is applicable under an added as-
sumption and that yields an alternative form of C-CAPM.
The intuition for what follows is based on a well known consequence of the
minimax theorem for multiple priors utility in abstract environments. For suitable
optimization problems, if a prospect, say e, is feasible and if the set of priors
contains a worst-case scenario P ∗ for e, then e is optimal if and only if it is
optimal also for a Bayesian agent who uses the single prior P ∗. Moreover, by a
form of envelope theorem, P ∗ suffices to describe marginal rates of substitution
at e and hence also supporting shadow prices. This suggests that there exist
sufficient conditions for e to be part of an equilibrium in our setup that refer to
P ∗ and less extensively to all other priors in P. We proceed now to explore this
direction.
As a first step, define P ∗ ∈ P to be a minimizing measure for e if
V0 (e) = E
P ∗[
∫ T
0
f(es, Vs (e))ds+ u (eT )]. (3.19)
As discussed when defining equilibrium, the fact that only weak dynamic consis-
tency is satisfied requires that one take into account also conditional perspectives.
Speaking informally, a minimizing measure P ∗ as above need not be minimizing
conditionally at a later time because of the nonequivalence of priors and the un-
certainty about what is possible. (Example 2.2 is readily adapted to illustrate
this.) Thus to be relevant to equilibrium, a stronger notion of “minimizing” is
required.
Recall that for any prior P in P, P ωτ is the version of the regular conditional of
P ; importantly, it is well-defined for every (τ, ω). Say that P ∗ ∈ P is a dynamically
minimizing measure for e if, for all τ , P-a.s.,
Vτ (e) = E
(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
f(es, Vs (e))ds+ u (eT )]. (3.20)
Next relax the equality (3.14) and assume instead: For every τ and P-almost
surely in ω,
piet /fc (e0, V0 (e)) = pit on [τ, T ] (P
∗)ωτ -a.s. (3.21)
Note that equality is assumed not only ex ante P ∗-a.s. but also conditionally, even
conditioning on events that are P ∗-null but that are possible according to other
priors in P.
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Theorem 3.5 (Sequential equilibrium II). Let P ∗ be a dynamic minimizer
for e and assume (3.21). Then (e, (rt, ηt)) is a sequential equilibrium.
The counterparts of the C-CAPM relations (3.16) and (3.18) are:34 For every
τ , P-a.s.,
bt − rt1 = −
(
etucc(et)
uc(et)
)
st(σ
∗
t σ
∗⊤
t )s
e
t on [τ, T ] (P
∗)ωτ -a.s. (3.22)
and
bt − rt1 = ρ−1[α(1− ρ)st(σ∗t σ∗⊤t )set + (ρ− α)st(σ∗t σ∗⊤t )sM on [τ, T ] (P ∗)ωτ -a.s.
(3.23)
Here P ∗ = P (σ
∗
t
) is induced by the process (σ∗t ) as in (2.10).
There are several ‘nonstandard’ features of these relations that we interpret in
the following example where the equations take on a more concrete form. How-
ever, it may be useful to consider the general forms briefly. For simplicity, con-
sider (3.22) corresponding to the standard aggregator. One effect of ambiguous
volatility is that the relevant instantaneous covariance between asset returns and
consumption is modified from sts
e
t to st(σ
∗
t σ
∗⊤
t )s
e
t , where (σ
∗
t ) is the worst-case
hypothesis for volatility. This adjustment reflects a conservative attitude and
confidence only that volatility (σt) lies everywhere in Γ rather than in any single
hypothesis, such as σt ≡ 1, satisfying this constraint.
Compare (3.22) also with the C-CAPM relation derived assuming ambiguity
about drift only. In that case, Chen and Epstein [12] show that, instead of (3.22),
mean excess returns satisfy
bt − rt1 = −
(
etucc(et)
uc(et)
)
sts
e
t + stµ
∗
t P0-a.s. (3.24)
where (µ∗t ) is the worst-case hypothesis for drift.
35 It is difficult to compare these
two alternative adjustments for ambiguity in general qualitative terms. Presum-
ably, each kind of ambiguity matters in some contexts, (though recall that drift
ambiguity has no effect in European options markets). Because both kinds of am-
biguity may matter simultaneously, one obviously would like to establish a version
of C-CAPM that accommodates both. However, that would require extensions
34Assume that there exists a dynamic minimizer P ∗ for e. Then one can show that (3.16)
implies (3.22) and (3.18) implies (3.23).
35More precisely, in the notation of Section 2.2, P ((µ
∗
t
),1) is a minimizer in the utility calculation
V0 (e) = infP∈P E
P [
∫ T
0
u(es)e
−βsds].
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of the machinery described in Appendix A that to our knowledge is currently
available only for environments described by G-Brownian motion.
Further interpretation and comparisons are discussed in the context of a final
example.
3.4. A final example
Theorem 3.4 begs the question whether or when dynamic minimizers exist. We
have no general answers at this point. But they exist in the following example.
Its simplicity also helps to illustrate the effects of ambiguous volatility on asset
returns.
We build on previous examples. Let d ≥ 1. The endowment process e satisfies
(under P0)
d log et = (s
e)⊤σtdBt, e0 > 0 given, (3.25)
where se is constant and B is a G-Brownian motion (thus the volatility matrix σt
is restricted only to lie in Γ). We assume that P0 lies in P, that is, Γ admits the
constant d× d identity matrix. Utility is defined, for any consumption process c,
by the following special case of (3.10):
Vt (c) = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
u(cs)e
−β(s−t)ds− e−β(T−t)u (cT ) | Ft],
where the felicity function u is
u (ct) = (ct)
α/α, 0 6= α < 1.
There exists a dynamic minimizer for e that depends on the sign of α. Compute
that
u (et) = α
−1eαt = α
−1eα0 exp
{
α
∫ t
0
(se)⊤σsdBs
}
Let σ and σ solve respectively
min
σ∈Γ
tr
(
σσ⊤se(se)⊤
)
and max
σ∈Γ
tr
(
σσ⊤se(se)⊤
)
. (3.26)
If d = 1, then Γ is a compact interval and σ and σ are its left and right endpoints.
Let P ∗ be the measure on Ω induced by P0 and X
∗, where
X∗t = σ
⊤Bt, for all t and ω;
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define P ∗∗ similarly using σ and X∗∗. Then, by a slight extension of the obser-
vation in Example 2.1, P ∗ is a dynamic minimizer for e if α < 0 and P ∗∗ is a
dynamic minimizer for e if α > 0.
Remark 4. That the minimizing measure corresponds to constant volatility is a
feature of this example. More generally, the minimizing measure in P defines a
specific stochastic volatility model. It is interesting to note that when volatility
is modeled by robustifying the Hull-White and Heston parametric forms, for ex-
ample, the minimizing measure does not lie in either parametric class. Rather it
corresponds to pasting the two alternatives together endogenously, that is, in a
way that depends on the endowment process and on α.
We describe further implications assuming α < 0; the corresponding state-
ments for α > 0 will be obvious to the reader. Interpretation of the sign of α is
confounded by the dual role of α in the additive expected utility model. However,
the example can be generalized to the Kreps-Porteus aggregator (3.17) and then
the same characterization of the worst-case volatility is valid with 1 − α inter-
pretable as the measure of relative risk aversion. Therefore, the intuition is clear
for the pricing results that follow: only the largest (in the sense of (3.26)) volatility
σ is relevant assuming α < 0 because it represents the worst-case scenario given
a large (greater than 1) measure of relative risk aversion.
Corresponding regular conditionals have a simple form. For example, (P ∗)ωτ is
the measure on Ω induced by the stochastic differential equation (under P0){
dXt = σdBt, τ ≤ t ≤ T
Xt = ωt, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
Thus under (P ∗)ωτ , the increment Bt −Bτ is N
(
0, σσ⊤ (t− τ)) for τ ≤ t ≤ T .
The C-CAPM (3.22) takes the form (assuming α < 0): For every τ , P-almost
surely in ω,
bt − rt1 = (1− α) st(σσ⊤)se on [τ, T ] (P ∗)ωτ -a.s.
For comparison purposes, it is convenient to express this equation partially in
terms of P0. The measures P0 and P
∗ differ only via the change of variables
defined via the SDE (2.10). Therefore, we arrive at the following equilibrium
condition: For every τ , P-almost surely in ω,
b̂t − r̂t1 = (1− α) ŝt(σσ⊤)se on [τ, T ] (P0)ωτ -a.s. (3.27)
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where b̂t = bt (X
σ
· ), r̂t = rt (X
σ
· ) and ŝt = st (X
σ
· ), corresponding to the noted
change of variables under which Bt 7−→ Xσt = σ⊤Bt. Note that the difference
between random variables with and without hats is ultimately not important
because they follow identical distributions under (P0)
ω
τ and (P
∗)ωτ respectively.
The impact of ambiguous volatility is most easily seen by comparing with the
standard C-CAPM obtained assuming complete confidence in the single probabil-
ity law P0 which renders B a standard Brownian motion. Then the prediction for
asset returns is
bt − rt1 = (1− α) stse on [0, T ] P0-a.s.
or equivalently: For every τ and P0-almost surely in ω,
bt − rt1 = (1− α) stse on [τ, T ] (P0)ωτ -a.s. (3.28)
There are two differences between the latter and the equilibrium condition
(3.27) for our model. First the “instantaneous covariance” between asset returns
and consumption is modified from sts
e to ŝt(σσ
⊤)se reflecting the fact that σ is the
worst-case volatility scenario for the representative agent. Such an effect, whereby
ambiguity leads to standard equilibrium conditions except that the reference mea-
sure is replaced by the worst-case measure, is familiar from the literature. The
second difference is new. Condition (3.28) refers to the single measure P0 only and
events that are null under P0 are irrelevant.
36 In contrast, the condition (3.27)
is required to hold P-almost surely in ω because, as described in Example 2.2,
dynamic consistency requires that possibility be judged according to all priors in
P.
Turn to a brief consideration of corresponding equilibrium prices. Fix a div-
idend stream (δ, δT ) ∈ M2 × L̂2(Ω) where the security is available in zero net
supply. Then its equilibrium price Sδ =
(
Sδτ
)
is given by: For all τ , P-a.s. in ω,
Sδτ = E
(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
piet
pieτ
δtdt+
pieT
pieτ
δT ], (3.29)
which lies between the hedging bounds in Theorem 3.1 by (3.21).37 It is interest-
ing to compare this equilibrium pricing rule with the price bounds derived from
hedging arguments (Theorem 3.1). Suppose the security in question is an option
36Similarly for the C-CAPM (3.24) when only drift is ambiguous, because then all priors are
equivalent to P0.
37The proof is analogous to that of Lemma B.4, particularly surrounding (B.8).
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on an underlying. Under the conditions of Example 3.2, the volatilities used to
define the upper and lower price bounds depend on whether the terminal payoff
is (globally) convex or concave as a function of the price of the underlying. In
contrast, the volatility used for equilibrium pricing is the same for all options
(and other securities) and depends only on the endowment and the preference
parameter α. This difference is further illustrated below.
If δ = e, then elementary calculations yield the time τ price of the endowment
stream in the form
Seτ = Aτeτ = Aτe0 exp
(
(se)⊤Bτ )
)
,
where Aτ > 0 is deterministic and AT = 1. Thus log (S
e
τ/Aτ ) = log eτ and the
logarithm of (deflated) price is also a G-Brownian motion. We can also price an
option on the endowment. Thus let δt = 0 for 0 ≤ t < T and δT = ψ (SeT ).
Denote its price process by Sψ. From (3.29), any such derivative is priced in
equilibrium as though σt were constant at σ (or at σ if α > 0). In particular,
for a European call option where δT = (S
e
T − κ)+, its equilibrium price at τ is
BSτ
(
(se)⊤σ, T, κ
)
, where the latter term denotes the Black-Scholes price at τ for
a call option with strike price κ and expiry time T when the underlying security
price process is geometric Brownian motion with volatility (se)⊤σ. Thus the
Black-Scholes implied variance is tr
(
σσ⊤se(se)⊤
)
which exceeds every conceivable
realized variance tr
(
σσ⊤se(se)⊤
)
, σ ∈ Γ, consistent with a documented empirical
feature of option prices.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have described a model of utility over continuous time consumption streams
that can accommodate ambiguity about volatility. Such ambiguity necessitates
dropping the assumption that a single measure defines null events, which is a
source of considerable technical difficulty. The economic motivation provided
for confronting the technical challenge is the importance of stochastic volatility
modeling in both financial economics and macroeconomics, the evidence that the
dynamics of volatility are complicated and difficult to pin down empirically, and
the presumption that complete confidence in any single parametric specification is
unwarranted and implausible. (Recall, for example, the quote in the introduction
from Carr and Lee [11].) These considerations suggest the potential usefulness of
‘robust stochastic volatility’ models (Section 1.2). We have shown that important
elements of representative agent asset pricing theory extend to an environment
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with ambiguous volatility. We also provided one example of the added explanatory
power of ambiguous volatility - it gives a way to understand the documented
feature of option prices whereby the Black-Scholes implied volatility exceeds the
realized volatility of the underlying security. However, a question that remains
to be answered more broadly and thoroughly is “does ambiguity about volatility
and possibility matter empirically?” In particular, it remains to determine the
empirical content of the derived C-CAPM relations. The contribution of this
paper has been to provide a theoretical framework within which one could address
such questions.
There are also several extensions at the theoretical level that seem worth pur-
suing. The utility formulation should be generalized to environments with jumps,
particularly in light of the importance attributed to jumps for understanding
options markets. The asset market analysis should be extended to permit am-
biguity specifications more general than G-Brownian motion. Extension to het-
erogeneous agent economies is important and intriguing. The nonequivalence of
measures raises questions about existence of equilibrium and about the nature of
no-arbitrage pricing (for reasons discussed in Willard and Dybvig [56]).
Two further questions that merit attention are more in the nature of refine-
ments, albeit nontrivial ones and beyond the scope of this paper. The fact that
utility is recursive but not strictly so suggests that though not every time 0 optimal
plan may be pursued subsequently at all relevant nodes, one might expect that
(under suitable regularity conditions) there exists at least one time 0 optimal plan
that will be implemented. (This is the case in Example 2.2 and also in the asset
market example in Section 3.4.) Sufficient conditions for such existence should be
explored. Secondly, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrated the significance of worst-
case scenarios in the form of dynamic minimizing measures. Their existence and
characterization pose important questions.
In terms of applications, we note that the model (slightly modified) can be in-
terpreted in terms of investor sentiments. Replace all infima by suprema and vice
versa. Then, the consumer may be described as an ambiguity lover, or alterna-
tively in terms of optimism and overconfidence. For example, in a recent study of
how the pricing kernel is affected by sentiment, Barone-Adesi et al. [5] subdivide
the latter and define optimism as occurring when the investor overestimates mean
returns and overconfidence as occurring when return volatility is underestimated.
This fits well with the distinction we have emphasized at a formal modeling level
between ambiguity about drift and ambiguity about volatility. In a continuous
time setting, ambiguity about drift, or optimism, can be modeled in a probability
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space framework, but not so ambiguity about volatility, or overconfidence.38
Wemention one more potential application. Working in a discrete-time setting,
Epstein and Schneider [25] point to ambiguous volatility as a way to model signals
with ambiguous precision. This leads to a new way to measure information quality
that has interesting implications for financial models (see also Illeditsch [34]).
The utility framework that we provide should permit future explorations of this
dimension of information quality in continuous time settings.
A. Appendix: G-Brownian Motion
Peng [45] introduced G-Brownian motion using PDE’s (specifically, a nonlinear
heat equation). Further contributions are due to Denis et al. [16] and Soner et
al. [51]. For the convenience of the reader, in this appendix we outline some
key elements of the theory of G-Brownian motion in terms of the specifics of our
model.
Itoˆ Integral and Quadratic Variation Process : For each η ∈ M2, we can consider
the usual Itoˆ integral
∫ T
0
η⊺t dBt, which lies in L̂
2(Ω). Each P ∈ P provides a
different perspective on the integral; a comprehensive view requires that one con-
sider all priors. The quadratic variation process 〈B〉 also agrees with the usual
quadratic variation process P-a.s. In Section 3.1 we defined a universal process v
(via (3.5)) and proved that
〈B〉 =
(
t∫
0
vsds : 0 ≤ t ≤ T
)
.
The following properties are satisfied for any λ, η ∈ M2, X ∈ L̂2(ΩT ) and
constant α:
Eˆ[Bt] = 0, Eˆ[
∫ T
0
η⊤t dBt] = 0,
Eˆ[(
∫ T
0
η⊤t dBt)
2] = Eˆ[
∫ T
0
η⊤t vtηtdt],∫ T
0
(αη⊤t + λ
⊤
t )dBt = α
∫ T
0
η⊤t dBt +
∫ T
0
λ⊤t dBt q.s.
Eˆ[X +
∫ T
s
η⊤t dBt | Fs] = Eˆ[X | Fs] + Eˆ[
∫ T
s
η⊤t dBt | Fs] = Eˆ[X | Fs]
38The applied finance literature has not used sets of priors in modeling sentiment. The use
of sets gives a best scenario, or subjective prior, that depends on the portfolio being evaluated.
Thus optimism can be exhibited for every portfolio as one might expect of an investor who has
an optimistic nature. In contrast when the subjective prior is fixed, then a high estimated return
for a security implies pessimism when the agent considers going short.
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For the one dimensional case (Γ = [σ, σ¯], σ > 0), we have
σ2t ≤ Eˆ[(Bt)2] ≤ σ¯2t,
σ2Eˆ[
∫ T
0
η2t dt] ≤ Eˆ[(
∫ T
0
ηtdBt)
2] ≤ σ¯2Eˆ[∫ T
0
η2t dt].
Itoˆ’s Formula: Consider
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
αsds+
∫ t
0
γsdBs
where α and γ are in M2(Rd) and M2(Rd×d) respectively. (Define M2(Rℓ×k)
similarly to M2 for Rℓ×k-valued processes.) We adapt Itoˆ’s formula from Li and
Peng [39, Theorem 5.4] or Soner et al. [52, Propn. 6.7] and rewrite it in our
context. Let 0 ≤ τ ≤ t ≤ T ; define v = (vij) by (3.5). Then, for any function
f : Rd → R with continuous second order derivatives, we have
f(Xt)−f(Xτ ) =
∫ t
τ
(fx(Xs))
⊤γsdBs+
∫ t
τ
(fx(Xs))
⊤αsds+
1
2
∫ t
τ
tr[γ⊤s fxx(Xs)vsγs]ds.
Consider the special case f(x1, x2) = x1x2 and
X it = X
i
0 +
∫ t
0
αisds+
∫ t
0
γisdBs, i = 1, 2,
where αi ∈M2 and γi ∈M2(Rd), i = 1, 2. Then
X1tX
2
t −X1τX2τ =
∫ t
τ
X1sdX
2
s +
∫ t
τ
X2sdX
1
s +
∫ t
τ
γ1svs(γ
2
s )
⊤ds.
Formal rules: As in the classical Itoˆ formula, if dXt = αtdt+ γtdBt, then we can
compute (dXt)
2 = (dXt) · (dXt) by the following formal rules:
dt · dt = dt · dBt = dBt · dt = 0, dBt · dBt = vtdt.
Martingale Representation Theorem: An F -progressively measurable L̂2(Ω)-valued
process X is called a G-martingale if and only if for any 0 ≤ τ < t, Xτ = Eˆ[Xt |
Fτ ]. We adapt the martingale representation theorem from Song [54] and Soner
et al. [51]. For any ξ ∈ L̂2+ε(Ω) and ε > 0, if Xt = Eˆ[ξ | Ft], t ∈ [0, T ], then we
have the following unique decomposition:
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ZsdBs −Kt,
where Z ∈M2, K is a continuous nondecreasing process withK0 = 0, KT ∈ L̂2(Ω)
and where −K is a G-martingale.
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B. Appendix: Proofs for Asset Returns
B.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Lemma B.1. Consider the following backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE) driven by G-Brownian motion:
dY˜t = (rtY˜t + η
⊤
t φ˜t − δt)dt− dKt + φ˜⊤t dBt,
Y˜T = δT .
Denote by I(0, T ) the space of all continuous nondecreasing processes (Kt)0≤t≤T
with K0 = 0 and KT ∈ L̂2(Ω). Then there exists a unique triple
(Y˜t, φ˜t, Kt) ∈M2 ×M2 × I(0, T ),
satisfying the BSDE such that K0 = 0 and where −Kt is a G-martingale.
Proof. Apply Ito’s formula to pitY˜t to derive
d(pitY˜t)
= pitdY˜t + Y˜tdpit − 〈pitφ˜⊤t , η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉
= (pitφ˜t − pitY˜tη⊤t v−1t )dBt − pitδtdt− pitdKt + [pitφ˜⊤t ηtdt− 〈pitφ˜⊤t , η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉]
= (pitφ˜t − pitY˜tη⊤t v−1t )dBt − pitδtdt− pitdKt.
Integrate on both sides to obtain
piT δT +
∫ T
τ
pitδtdt = piτ Y˜τ −
∫ T
τ
pitdKt +
∫ T
τ
(pitφ˜
⊤
t − pitY˜tη⊤t v−1t )dBt. (B.1)
Let
Xτ = Eˆ[piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt | Fτ ].
Then (Xτ ) is a G-martingale. By the martingale representation theorem (Ap-
pendix A), there exists a unique pair (Zt, Kt) ∈M2 × I(0, T ) such that
Xτ = Eˆ[piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt] +
∫ τ
0
ZtdBt −Kt,
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and such that −K t is a G-martingale. This can be rewritten as
Xτ = XT −
∫ T
τ
ZtdBt +KT −Kt
= piT δT +
∫ T
0
pitδtdt−
∫ T
τ
ZtdBt +KT −Kτ .
Thus (Y˜t, φ˜t, Kt) is the desired solution where
Y˜τ =
Xτ
πτ
−
∫ τ
0
πt
πτ
δtdt,
φ˜⊤τ =
Zτ
πτ
+ Y˜τη
⊤
τ v
−1
t , and Kτ =
∫ τ
0
1
πt
dKt. 
Turn to proof of the theorem. We prove only the claim re superhedging. Proof
of the other claim is similar.
Step 1: Prove that for any y ∈ Uτ ,
y ≥ Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt+
piT
piτ
δT | Fτ ]
If y ∈ Uτ , there exists φ such that Y y,φ,τT ≥ δT . Apply (the G-Brownian version
of) Itoˆ’s formula to pitY
y,φ,τ
t to derive
d(pitY
y,φ,τ
t )
= pitdY
y,φ,τ
t + Y
y,φ,τ
t dpit − 〈pitφ⊤t , η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉
= (pitφt − pitY y,φ,τt η⊤t v−1t )dBt − pitδtdt+ [pitφ⊤t ηtdt− 〈pitφ⊤t , η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉].
Integration on both sides yields
piTY
y,φ,τ
T +
∫ T
τ
pitδtdt = piτy +
∫ T
τ
(pitφ
⊤
t − pitY y,φ,τt η⊤t v−1t )dBt,
and taking conditional expectations yields
y = Eˆ[
piT
piτ
Y y,φ,τT +
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt | Fτ ]
≥ Eˆ[piT
piτ
δT +
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt | Fτ ].
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Step 2: There exists yˆ ∈ Uτ and φˆ such that Y yˆ,φˆ,τT ≥ δT and
yˆ = Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt+
piT
piτ
δT | Fτ ].
Apply the preceding lemma. Rewrite equation (B.1) as
piT δT +
∫ T
τ
pitδtdt = piτ Y˜τ +
∫ T
τ
(pitφ˜
⊤
t − pitY˜tη⊤t v−1t )dBt −
∫ T
τ
pitdKt. (B.2)
Because pit is positive and −Kt is a G-martingale, Eˆ[−
∫ T
τ
pitdKt | Fτ ] = 0. Thus,
Eˆ[piT δT +
∫ T
τ
pitδtdt | Fτ ] = piτ Y˜τ
Finally, define yˆ = Y˜τ and φˆ = φ˜. Then yˆ ∈ Uτ and
yˆ = Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
δtdt+
piT
piτ
δT | Fτ ].
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
B.2. Proof of Theorem 3.3
(i) Apply Itoˆ’s formula for G-Brownian motion to derive39
d(pitYt)
= pitdYt + Ytdpit − 〈pitφ⊤t , η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉
= (pitφt − pitYtη⊤t v−1t )dBt − pit(ct − et)dt+ [pitφ⊤t ηtdt− 〈pitφ⊤t , η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉].
(B.3)
Note that for any a = (at) ∈M2,∫ T
τ
atv
−1
t d〈B〉t =
∫ T
τ
atdt,
and therefore, ∫ T
τ
〈pitφt, η⊤t v−1t d〈B〉t〉 =
∫ T
τ
pitφ
⊤
t ηtdt.
39For any d-dimensional (column) vectors x and y, we use 〈x⊤, y⊤〉 occasionally as alternative
notation for the inner product x⊤y.
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Accordingly, integration on both sides of (B.3) yields,
piTYT +
∫ T
τ
pit(ct − et)dt = piτYτ +
∫ T
τ
(pitφ
⊤
t − pitYtη⊤t v−1t )dBt.
Take conditional expectations to obtain
Eˆ[piTYT +
∫ T
τ
pit(ct − et)dt | Fτ ] = piτYτ + Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
(pitφ
⊤
t − pitYtη⊤t v−1t )dBt | Fτ ].
Because B being G-Brownian motion implies that B is a martingale under every
prior in P, we have
0 = Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
(pitφ
⊤
t − pitYtη⊤t v−1t )dBt | Fτ ] = Eˆ[−
∫ T
τ
(pitφ
⊤
t − pitYtη⊤t v−1t )dBt | Fτ ],
which gives the desired result.
(ii) We need to find a process φ such that, for the given c, the solution (Yt) to
dYt = (rtYt + η
⊤
t φt − (ct − et))dt+ φ⊤t dBt, t ∈ [τ, T ]
YT = cT − eT
has time τ wealth equal to the given value Yτ .
For τ ≤ s ≤ T , define
Xs ≡ Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
(ct − et)dt+ piT
piτ
(cT − eT ) | Fs].
Then Xs = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
τ
πt
πτ
(ct − et)dt − πTπτ (cT − eT ) | Fs] and (Xs)τ≤s≤T is a sym-
metric G-martingale. By Soner et. al. [51] and Song [54], it admits the unique
representation
Xs = Xτ +
∫ s
τ
Z⊤t dBt,
where Z ∈ M2. Note that
Xτ = Eˆ[
∫ T
τ
pit
piτ
(ct − et)dt+ piT
piτ
(cT − eT ) | Fτ ] = Yτ .
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Set
Y¯s ≡ Xs −
∫ s
τ
pit
piτ
(ct − et)dt, s ∈ [τ, T ].
Then (Y¯s) satisfies
dY¯s = −pis
piτ
(cs − es)ds+ Z⊤s dBs, Y¯τ = Yτ .
Define
Ys ≡ Y¯s(pis
piτ
)−1.
Note that (pis) satisfies
dpis/pis = −rsds− η⊤s v−1s dBs, s ∈ [τ, T ].
Apply Ito’s formula for G-Brownian motion to derive
dYs = [rsYs + η
⊤
s (Ys(v
−1
s )
⊤ηs +
piτ
pis
Zs)− (cs − es)]ds+ (Ysη⊤s v−1s +
piτ
pis
Z⊤s )dBs.
Finally, set
φ⊤s ≡ Ysη⊤s v−1s +
piτ
pis
Z⊤s .
Then
dYs = (rsYs + η
⊤
s φt − (cs − es))ds+ φ⊤s dBs, s ∈ [τ, T ].
This completes the proof. 
B.3. Proof of Theorem 3.4
The proof follows from Theorem 3.3 and the following lemma.
Lemma B.2. For every c, we have: For each τ , P-almost surely,
Ê
[∫ T
τ
piet (ct − et) dt+ pieT (cT − eT ) | Fτ
]
≤ 0 =⇒ (B.4)
Vτ (c) ≤ Vτ (e) .
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Proof. Define δt implicitly by
f(ct, Vt(c)) = fc(et, Vt (e))(ct− et) + fv(et, Vt (e))(Vt(c)− Vt(e))− δt+ f(et, Vt (e)),
for 0 ≤ t < T , and
u(cT ) = uc(eT )(cT − eT )− δT + u(eT ).
Because f and u are concave, we have δt ≥ 0 on [0, T ].
Define, for 0 ≤ t < T ,
βt = fv(et, Vt (e))
γt = fc(et, Vt (e))(ct − et) + f(et, Vt (e))− βtVt(e)− δt
γT = −uc(eT )eT + u(eT )− δT
ζt = f(et, Vt (e))− βtVt(e).
Then
Vt(c) = −Eˆ[−(uc(eT )cT + γT )−
∫ T
t
(βsVs(c) + γs)ds | Ft].
Because this is a linear backward stochastic differential equation, its solution has
the form (by Hu and Ji [32])
Vt(c) = −Eˆ[−(uc(eT )cT + γT ) exp{
∫ T
t
βsds} −
∫ T
t
γs exp{
∫ s
t
βs′ds
′}ds | Ft].
Similarly for e, we have
Vt(e) = −Eˆ[−u(eT )−
∫ T
t
(βsVs(e) + ζs)ds | Ft],
and (by Hu and Ji [32]),
Vt(e) = −Eˆ[−u(eT ) exp{
∫ T
t
βsds} −
∫ T
t
ζs exp{
∫ s
t
βs′ds
′}ds | Ft].
Apply the subadditivity of Eˆ [· | Fτ ] and the nonnegativity of δt to obtain
exp{∫ τ
0
βsds} (Vτ (c)− Vτ (e)) =
−Eˆ[−(uc(eT )cT + γT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
γt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt | Fτ ]
−{−Eˆ[−u(eT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
ζt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt | Fτ ]} =
49
Eˆ[−u(eT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
ζt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt | Fτ ]
−Eˆ[−(uc(eT )cT + γT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
γt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt | Fτ ] ≤
Eˆ[−u(eT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
ζt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt
−(−(uc(eT )cT + γT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
γt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt | Fτ ] =
Eˆ[(uc(eT )cT + γT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds}+
∫ T
τ
γt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt
−u(eT ) exp{
∫ T
0
βsds} −
∫ T
τ
ζt exp{
∫ t
0
βsds}dt | Fτ ] =
Eˆ[exp{∫ T
0
βsds}uc(eT )(cT − eT ) +
∫ T
τ
exp{∫ t
0
βsds}fc(et, Vt (e))(ct − et)dt
− exp{∫ T
0
βsds}δT −
∫ T
τ
exp{∫ t
0
βsds}δtdt | Fτ ] ≤
Eˆ[exp{∫ T
0
βsds}uc(eT )(cT − eT ) +
∫ T
τ
exp{∫ t
0
βsds}fc(et, Vt (e))(ct − et)dt | Fτ ]
= Ê
[
pieT (cT − eT ) +
∫ T
τ
piet (ct − et) dt | Fτ
]
.
This completes the proof. 
B.4. C-CAPM for General Aggregators
We derive (3.18) and the corresponding form of the C-CAPM for general aggre-
gators, thus justifying claims made following Theorem 3.4. Utility is defined by
(3.10).
Lemma B.3. For given c ∈ D, there is a unique solution Vt to
Vt (c) = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c))ds− u (cT ) | Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Further, there exist unique Z ∈ M2 and K (a continuous nondecreasing process
with K0 = 0) such that
Vt = u (cT ) +
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+
∫ T
t
ZsdBs −KT +Kt.
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Proof. Define
Ut = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
0
f(cs, Vs (c))ds− u (cT ) | Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Note that
U0 = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
0
f(cs, Vs (c))ds− u (cT )],
UT =
∫ T
0
f(cs, Vs (c))ds− u (cT ) .
Because −Ut is a G-martingale, it has the following unique representation:
−Ut = −U0 +
∫ t
0
ZsdBs −Kt.
Then
Vt = −Eˆ[−
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c))ds− u (cT ) | Ft]
= Ut −
∫ t
0
f(cs, Vs (c))ds
= U0 −
∫ t
0
ZsdBs +Kt −
∫ t
0
f(cs, Vs (c))ds.
Note that
VT = u (cT )
= U0 −
∫ T
0
ZsdBs +KT −
∫ T
0
f(cs, Vs (c))ds =⇒
Vt − VT = Vt − u (cT )
=
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+
∫ T
t
ZsdBs −KT +Kt =⇒
Vt = u (cT ) +
∫ T
t
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+
∫ T
t
ZsdBs −KT +Kt.
Uniqueness of (Vt) follows by standard contraction mapping arguments (see our
companion paper). 
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The preceding representation of utility, combined with Ito’s Lemma for G-
Brownian motion, yields
bt − rt1 = −fcc (et, Vt) et
fc (et, Vt)
stvts
e
t +
fcV (et, Vt)
fc (et, Vt)
stvtZ
⊤
t . (B.5)
For the Kreps-Porteus aggregator (3.17), this becomes
bt − rt1 = (1− ρ)stvtset +
α− ρ
α
stvt
Z⊤t
Vt
. (B.6)
Then (3.18) follows from the following relation (which can be proven as in Chen
and Epstein [12] by exploiting the homogeneity of degree α of utility):
Zt/(αVt) = ρ
−1[sM + (ρ− 1)set ].
B.5. Proof of Theorem 3.5
The strategy is to argue that for any c ∈ Υτ (0),
Vτ (c)− Vτ (e) = Vτ (c)−E(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
f(es, Vs (e))ds+ u (eT )]
† ≤ E(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+ u (cT )]
− E(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
f(es, Vs (e))ds+ u (eT )]
≤ E(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
piet (ct − et)dt+ pieT (cT − eT )]
by (3.21) = fc (e0, V0 (e))E
(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
pit(ct − et)dt+ piT (cT − eT )]
†† ≤ fc (e0, V0 (e)) Ê[
∫ T
τ
pit(ct − et)dt+ piT (cT − eT ) | Fτ ] ≤ 0.
The inequalities marked † and †† are justified in the next lemma.
Lemma B.4. For every τ , P-almost surely,
Vτ (c) ≤ E(P ∗)ωτ [
∫ T
τ
f(es, Vs (e))ds+ u (eT )], (B.7)
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and
E(P
∗)ω
τ [
∫ T
τ
pit(ct − et)dt+ piT (cT − eT )]
≤ Ê[
∫ T
τ
pit(ct − et)ds+ piT (cT − eT ) | Fτ ].
Proof. We prove the first inequality. The second is proven similarly.
We claim that for any P ∈ P and τ , there exists P ∈ P such that
P = P on Fτ and Pωt = (P ∗)ωt for all (t, ω) ∈ [τ, T ]× Ω. (B.8)
This follows from the construction of priors in P via the SDE (2.10). Let P ∗ and
P be induced by θ∗ and θ respectively and define θ ∈ Θ by
θt =
{
θt 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
θ∗t τ < t ≤ T .
Then P = P θ satisfies (B.8). It follows from the detailed construction of condi-
tional expectation Ê [· | Fτ ], that P -a.e.
Vτ (c) ≤ EP [
∫ T
τ
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+ u (cT ) | Fτ ]
= EP
ω
τ [
∫ T
τ
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+ u (cT )]
= E(P
∗)ω
τ [
∫ T
τ
f(cs, Vs (c))ds+ u (cT )]
The first equality follows from P = P on Fτ and properties of regular conditionals
(see Yong and Zhou [57, Propns. 1.9, 1.10]). Moreover, the preceding is true for
any P ∈ P. 
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